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ABSTRACT 
The Use of Mental Imagery Among Young Children in the 
Acquisition of Piaget's Principles of Conservation 
by 
Richard C. Sweetland, Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah State University, 1968 
Major Professor: Dr. Heber C. Sharp 
Department: Psychology 
X 
This study attempted to discover some parameters in terms of mental 
age at which young children, ages five through eight, begin to utilize effectively 
their mental imagery in the learning process. Using Piaget's principles of 
conservation as a learning task, subjects were taught in one of two groups: 
Group one was instructed in conservation concepts by use of concrete example , 
in which case they were allowed to see, handle and manipulate materials as 
they underwent transformations. Group two received identical instruction 
but were called upon to use their mental imagery to visualize the materials 
undergoing transformations. 
Based upon the administration of the California Test of Mental Maturity 
and a pretest, sixteen non-conserving subjects from the kindergarten, first, 
second, and third grades, making a total of sixty-four subjects, were grouped 
by matching I. Q. 's to receive four periods of instruction in the principles of 
conservation. Following instruction each subject was individually administered 
a posttest and a test of extinction. The test of extinction was designed to 
measure the degree or depth of conservation acquisition achieved by each 
subject. 
xi 
A statistical analysis of the data indicated that while children of ages 
five through eight were able to learn conservation through both methods of 
instruction, mental age and I. Q . 's were not determining variables. No learning 
curve based on mental age or I. Q . was discernible. It was strongly indicated, 
however, that boys resist extinction of conservation principles better when 
taught through concrete example than they do when taught through mental 
imagery. Girls utilize mental imagery in acquiring conservation better than 
do boys of the same age, and as well as boys who learn by use of concrete 
illustration. Girls' use of mental imagery in the learning process appears to 
be equal to their use of concrete example. 
(157 pages) 
PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
... science thrives upon revolution. Really big ones may be 
relatively rare, but little ones are its daily bread . Science is 
in fact a continuing, even if intermittent, revolution . Every 
step it takes involves some change .. . (Adams, 1963 , p. 5) 
When in 1921 Jean Piaget started his investigation into the cognitive 
processes of young children, psychologists little recognized the revolution 
that would follow. In fact, early reception of Piaget's theories gave no indication 
of the impact of his studies. But today , perhaps more than any living psychologist, 
Piaget is respected for his contribution to the ongoing "revolution" or evolution 
of the science of developmental psychology . 
Herbert, James, Thorndike, Ebbinghaus, P avlov , Hull , Watson, Tolman , 
and Skinner , to give tribute to but a few , have lighted the path of psychology in 
the investigation of "how" animals, including Homo sapiens , learn; Pi aget has , 
through patient and meticulous investigation, set forth firmly his claims regard-
ing the "process" by which the human animal develops his cognition . Perhaps 
no modern theorist has had a more widespread, heuristic effect on modern learn-
ing theory and child development . 
The effects of the Darwinian revolution have not been limited to the 
biological laboratory, but have permeated all areas of knowledge ; nor have the 
theories of Freud been confined to the chamber of the psychoanalyst . While it 
may be pre:rm ture to place Piaget in the company of Darwin and Freud , the 
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implications and heuristic value of his theories have certainly been far-reaching . 
John H. Flavell, who by no means takes a totally uncritical view of 
Piaget's work, eulogizes him as follows: 
... he has given us more information ... about intellectual 
development than anyone else has ... For one thing, the kinds 
of cognition he has studied seem particularly fundamental in 
human experience. 
Piaget has tried as few others have, to cut through the 
phenotypical mist and dig out the genotypes of intellectual adaptation. 
But his findings are of high quality in another sense; they are novel ; 
they are unexpected; they have the knack of lurching us abruptly 
forward in our understanding of children, as few findings in the field 
do . Most developmentalists are rather jaded child-watchers, after 
all, and we seldom read anything new about children which really 
surprises us. But I for one, gulped a little when I first learned from 
Piaget that many four-year-olds will blithely assert that the weight 
of a clay ball changes as its form changes; that the number of buttons 
are spaced out; and that two events do not necessarily take the same 
amount of time to occur, just because they started and stopped at the 
same instance. What Piaget has done is to show us that our mundane 
and commonplace axioms is the most basic realms of human experi-
ence--space, time , number, causality, and so--exist and have 
axiomatic status only at the end of a complex and highly interesting 
evolution , not at the outset. it will become increasingly 
hazardous for anyone planning research in the area to ignore his 
work. . .. (Flavell, 1936, pp. 245-248) 
Need for the Study 
From the point of view of pure science, no justification need ever be 
given for research. Like Mt. Everest, whose very presence compels climbers 
to explore its heights, natural phenomena demands investigation. From the 
point of view of applied science, however, there are a number of impelling 
reasons for extended investigations of mental imagery, the most important 
being its implications to the learning process. In the field of public education, 
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Brown, Bonner, and Weir (1963) and Gardner (1962), along with a host of others, 
have pointed out the "logical necessity" of improving our present educational 
methods in order to reach our national potential. Anderson (1959, 1961), 
Guilford (1959), Taylor (1960, 1962) and Torrance (1960, 1961a , 1961b) have 
stressed the need for further investigation into the nature of the intellect in 
order to facilitate the individual child's efforts toward self-realization . 
That an investigation of mental imagery , that "neglected human capacity" 
(Holt, 1964), has been slighted during the past fifty years of scientific investigation 
is no secret. An inspection of psychological journals for the past ten years, 
however, reveals a progressively increasing interest in the subject. Piaget and 
his fellow workers have experimented in the phenomena of mental imagery in 
recent years and are soon to publish their findings (Flavell, 1963a). The present 
study was conducted in the hope that it might yield some contribution to a better 
understanding of children's utilization of this important faculty. 
Organization of the Study 
The presentation of the present study consists of six parts. The outline 
by parts is as follows: 
I. Introduction--a brief background statement concerning Piaget's work 
and a tribute to his powers of investigation; the need for the study; and, the 
organization of the study. 
II, Review of literature--a presentation of the historical background to 
the study of mental imagery; a definition of mental imagery; a general review of 
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Piaget's theories of cognition , including sections on: Piaget's theory of 
cognitive phylogeny ; the basic properties of cognitive functioning; the scientific 
aims of Piaget's studies; Piaget's method of investigation ; Piaget's stages of 
cognitive development; Piaget's contribution to the study of mental imagery; and 
the heuristic effects of Piaget's theories. 
III. Research Design--a description of the plan of the study, stating 
hypotheses, definitions , and limitations; a presentation of the methods , pro-
cedures, and techniques employed to analyze the proposed problem. 
IV. Results or Findings--a description of statistical data . 
V. Discussion--an interpretation of the findings and some implications 
for future research . 
VI. Summary and Conclusions--a brief summar y of the present study and 
concluding remarks. 
Summary 
In the present chapter a brief introduction and tribute to Jean Piaget plus 
a statement regarding the contributions he has made to the study of cognitive 
development was presented . Evidence for the need of additional investigation 
into the general area of cognitive functions and the specific area of mental 
imagery was presented, hence confirming the need for the present study. The 
chapter concluded with a statement of the organizational plan of the present 
dissertation. 
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PART II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Historical Background to the Study of Mental Imagery 
In keeping with the structuralism of Wilhelm Wundt and his disciple 
Edward Titchener, many psychologists of the late nineteenth century atomistically 
divided consciousness into three components, sensations, images, and feelings. 
By using what was then considered a "scientific method of investigation," trained 
introspection, these psychologists investigated cognitive functioning. Other 
II pioneers in the field of cognition, such as Binet , Kulpe, and Woodworth, were 
unable to conclude with the Structuralists that the study of man's cognitive powers 
must of necessity remain general in nature and sought to delineate more precisely 
the nature of the mind. Alfred Binet, for example, using his own daughters as 
subjects, concluded that images and sensations were not necessary for all forms 
of thinking (Sargent and Stafford, 1965). Binet surmised that the raw materials of 
thinking were simply pense~s or thoughts and were by nature incapable of further 
analysis. 
~I 
The Wurzburg psychologists, lead by Oswald Kulpe and Karl Marbe, 
extended the investigation by experimentation in the field of weight differentiation . 
Subjects were asked to select the heavier of two weights and to report their mental 
I/ 
functioning during the judgmental process. Kulpe and Marbe concluded with 
Binet that images were not necessary to all thought processes and used the term 
"conscious attitudes" to describe the non-imagerial phenomena (Johnson, 1955), 
Karl Buhler, conducting studies in the thought process of fable interpretation , 
agreed with KG"lpe and Marbe's findings. 
Conducting similar experiments in America , Robert S. Woodworth 
stressed the "consciousness of relationships" in the process of thinking and 
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coined the term "imageless thought" (Sargent and Stafford, 1965). Later, Thomas 
V . Moore discovered a time lag between the awareness of meaning and the mental 
images accompanying meaning and, in agreement with his predecessors , con-
cluded that meaning or thinking was not dependent upon images (Sargent and 
Stafford, 1965), Further investigation in the process of thought led Otto Selz , 
another Wurzburg psychologist , to stress the im portance of what he called 
"anticipatory schema , " a concept somewhat similar to Mar be ' s "c onscious 
attitudes," Woodworth' s "feelings of relationships ," and similar to the modern 
psychological concept of "mental set." Thinking is influenced , according to 
Selz , by what the subject plans or anticipates. 
While the tide of psychological opinion has gone against Wundt and 
Titchener's theory of mental elements--sensations , images, and feelings--
psychologists have by no means forsaken the study of these three aspects of 
cognition . Vygotsky (1962) pointed out that imagery was certainly one , but only 
one, of the several factors which when functioning together permitted concept 
formation. Other writers (Brown, 1956; Heckel and Peacock, 1966 ; Morgan and 
King , 1960; Ruch, 1967; and Taylor and Barron, 1966) stressed the variety of 
individual differences in the use of mental imagery, indicating that there was 
not a high correlation between the presence of vivid imagery in one's thought 
processes and one's capacity to do advanced mathematical , scientific , and 
creative thinking. Brown (1956), in stressing the imagerial differences among 
individuals, concluded that the variety lay in the nervous system , "in the sense 
of changes in synaptic resistance or neurone process growth" (Brown , 1956 , 
pp. 274-275; see also Holt, 1964, pp. 257-260), Holt (1964), based on previous 
work by Boring and Titchener , identified thirteen types of imagery used under 
various cognitive conditions. 
The relationship between mental imager y and sensation and perception 
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has been thoroughly investigated. Kulpe , placing a scr een before subjects se ated 
in a darkened room , asked them to state when a dimly colored light appe ared . Even 
though no light was flashed upon the screen, many subjects "imagined" the light. 
K~'J.pe thus concluded that imagery was indistinguishable from visu al s ensations ~ 
Similar experiments were conducted by C. W. Perky (Sargent and Stafford, 1965) 
in which a faint picture of a banana was flashed upon a screen; subjects felt that 
the visual sensation of the banana was produced by their imagery. Edmund 
Jacobson , experimenting with the relation of muscular contractions to imagery, 
concluded that imagery is always accompanied by some degree of muscular tension. 
These experiments, however , failed to make definitive the relationship between 
imagery and sensations. 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1965) concluded that imagery and perception were not 
identical. It is difficult, if not impossible, stated Sartre, to look upon or 
perceive an object and experience a mental image of another subject at the same 
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time; imagery "can arise only at the cost of the annihilation of perceptual con-
sciousness." (Sartre, 1965, p. 174) The difference between fue actual perception 
and the image is the difference between the real and the unreal, the actual, con-
crete, and the quasi-actual and quasi-concrete. 
A Definition of Mental Imagery 
While researchers have been able to present rather detailed and descrip-
tive definitions of many of the aspects of general cognition , unfortunately most 
writers dealing with mental imagery have been content with vague or generalized 
definitions of imagery. Morgan and King (1966), for example, define imagery as 
L a "representation in the brain of sensory experience" (Morgan and King, 1966 , 
p. 771). Ruch ( 1967) has been even more general, using as a definition of 
imagery, " ... mental pictures of actual sensory experience" (Ruch, 1967, p . 
342). Warren (1934), in his Dictionary of Psychology, has been content with 
" an experience which reproduces or copies ih part, and with some degree 
of sensory realism, a previous perceptual experience in the absence of the 
original sensory stimulation" (Warren, 1934, p. 178). Webster's (New Inter-
national Dictionary, 1949) "to form a likeness of by the fancy or recollection" 
is no more specific. Olver (1966), in discussing Bruner's iconic representations ', 
quotes Bartlett's rather descriptive definition of mental imagery: 
In general, images are a device for picking bits out of schemes, 
for increasing the chance of variability in the reconstruction of 
past stimuli and situations, for surmounting the chronology of 
presentations ... (Imagery) facilitates the operations of the past 
in relation to the somewhat changed conditions of the present . 
(Bartlett, 1932, pp. 218-219) 
Frequently, writers on mental imagery simply by-pass a definition of imagery 
and proceed to describe it through example. 
9 
Piaget's writings lack a formal declaration as to the meaning of mental 
imagery. While rejecting the standard conception of imagery as "mere reacti-
vations of traces of past experience" (Berlyne, 1957, p. 166), Piaget defines mental 
imagery as ". . . the figurative aspect of representational thought . 
interiorized imitation ... a tool, an aid to the process of thought . 
a kind of 
simply 
copies, more or less faithful, of what has already been seen" (Ripple and 
Rockcastle, 1964, pp. 30-31). 
The paucity of definitions of mental imagery is undoubtedly related to the 
lack of empirical research in the area and the communality of imagerial experi-
ence. Since most people experience mental imagery in their thought processes, 
there has appeared to be no need for defining it. A definition of mental imagery 
evolving from the present study will be presented in the Discussion of this 
dissertation. 
A General Review of Jean Piaget's Theory of Cognition 
Piaget's theory of cognitive phylogeny 
For Piaget, intelligence or cognition is basically, in its rudimentary 
forms, biological. Piaget uses the term "mental embryology" (Flavell, 1963) 
to describe this aspect of his theory. The organism and intelligence, as well 
as emotion, are one. All of the refinements of human development, such as 
cognitive disposition and emotional constitution, are expressions of the biological 
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organism. Speaking of the physiological qualities of Piaget's theory of intelligence, 
Flavell ( 1963) wrote, "Intellectual functioning is . . . a special extension of bio-
logical functioning at large; and its fundamental and invariant properties are the 
same as those found in biological activity." (Flavell , 1963, p. 43) This facet 
of Piaget's thought will be developed in a latter section of this paper when the 
first of Piaget's stages of cognitive growth is discussed. 
While Piaget views intellectual growth as following a continuum from 
birth to adulthood, he sees it as containing clusters at certain points, so as to 
merit its being classified into stages. His stages are invariant in sequence, 
though the onset of each stage is variant with the individual and the culture in 
which he finds himself (Flavell , 1963; Tuddenham, 1966) . 
Basic properties of cognitive functioning 
Fundamental to the understanding of Piaget's formulations of child 
development, and hence the basic properties of cognitive functioning, is a grasp 
of his terminology. Three terms form the foundation for Piaget's extensive 
theory: adaptation, assimilation and accommodation. As explained in The 
Origin of Intelligence in Children (Piaget, 1952), these three terms are 
intricately related. Adaptation is the natural striving of the "protoplasmic 
consciousness," the cognitive essence or the thinking process of the individual, 
to find and maintain an equilibrium between itself and its environment. Piaget 
states, "There is adaptation when the organism is transformed by the environ-
ment and when this variation results in an increase in the interchanges between 
the environment and itself which are favorable to its preservation. 17 (Piaget, 
1952, p. 5) Adaptation results in emotional and cognitive balance, a state 
called equilibration. 
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Adaptation, then, is the fundamental process and state of union between 
the person and his world. Adaptation is basically a state, but Piaget transforms 
it into a process through its relation to assimilation and accommodation. 
In assimilation, the individual incorporates the external environment 
unto (into) himself. In the process of accommodation, the individual adjusts him-
self to meet the realities of the environment. The two processes find fulfillment 
in adaptation: ". . . we can accordingly say that adaptation is an equilibrium 
between assimilation and accommodation." (Piaget, 1952, p. 6) "In short," 
Piaget summarized, "intellectual adaptation, like every other kind , consists 
of putting an assimilatory mechanism and a complementary accommodation 
into progressive equilibrium . " (Piaget, 1952, p. 7) 
Some readers of Piaget feel that his terminology, assimilation and 
adaptation, are simply new words for old concepts: assimilation being synony-
mous with what learning theorists call "generalization" and "discrimination;" 
accommodation being another way of expressing the concept of "differentiation 
of responses." (Berlyne, 1957) 
The phrase "primary processes" is used by Piaget to identify undifferen-
tiated mental processes in their early development, up to about age seven, at 
which period the child begins to use logical processes (Piaget, 1952). 
The term "schema" is repeatedly used by Piaget in almost all of his 
basic writings. Piaget does not, however, devote any one extended section in 
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his books to defining this important concept represented by this term (Flavell, 
1963). Basically, a schema is a hypothetical construct used to account for the 
"firming up" of cognitive habits, the functional structuring of a mental disposition 
to respond in a sequential and predictable manner. Flavell ( 1963) defined a schema 
as an "active sequence" (Flavell, 1963, p. 56), and Maier (1965) called it a 
"psychological unit of intellectual behavior" (Maier, 1965, p . 96). For example, 
one of the first schemas to develop in infancy is that of prehension in which the 
young child consistently follows a pattern of reaching, finger-curling , and 
retracting--thus forming a repeatable unit. Flavell (1963), in summarizing 
this concept, stated, "Schemas therefore refer to classes of total acts, acts 
which are distinct from one another and yet share common features." (Flavell, 
1963, p . 54) Piaget's term "reciprocal assimilation" (Piaget , 1952 , pp. 142-
143) describes the phenomena of two or more schemas, which having developed 
independently , unite to form a new pattern of cognitive and thus behavioral action. 
Perhaps one of the most widely known and used terms of Piagetian theory 
is "egocentrism . " Basically, egocentrism is used to denote that state in infancy 
and early childhood in which the child sees reality from only one prespective--
his own. The youngster is unable to differentiate between himself and his environ-
ment; he experiences consciousness, but not the awareness of consciousness, 
being conscious of neither, but only of unity. Reality, for the egocentric mind, 
is thus distorted, flat, and lacking in dimension (Piaget, 1952). 
The scientific aims of Piaget's studies 
As both a learning theorist and a student of child development, Piaget's 
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work has as its goal the comprehensive analysis and understanding of cognitive 
development from birth to maturity, in this case a state reached during adoles-
cence. The main thrust of Piaget's efforts has been to describe the mental 
structures which, as they evolve, enable the individual to pass from one stage 
of intellectual development to another . Piaget distinguishes between cognitive 
"content," the raw data with which the individual deals or which he preceives; 
cognitive "function," the manner in which the individual responds to the content; 
and cognitive "structure," the mental organization or system that regulates and 
guides the cognitive functioning (Flavell, 1963). Succinctly stated, Piaget" . . 
is primarily interested in the theoretical and experimental investigation of the 
qualitative development of intellectual structures." (Flavell, 1963, p. 15) 
While primarily concerned with the evolution of mental structures, 
Piaget's investigations have also led him to make significant contributions in 
the study of childhood perception, motivation, values and moral attitudes, and 
their implications for education (Piaget, 1955; Flavell, 1963), 
Basic to Piaget's scientific investigation of cognitive phylogeny is the 
belief in cosmic unification, that both organic and inorganic matter exist in 
harmony with common laws. Through sys tematic analysis of the parts , as 
seen through the various fields of science, Piaget seeks to comprehend the 
whole. 
piaget' _s melhotL c;:iL_investigation 
Perhaps the most basic criticism leveled at Piaget's theories deals, 
not with their content, but with his method of investigation (Berlyne, 1957). 
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While Piaget is well trained in the methods of empirical research , many of his 
theories, especially in their ear lier presentations, are based on personal 
(subjective) observations (Dodwell, 1960). For example, almost all of Piaget's 
rather exhaustive volume, The Origin of Intelligence in Children (Piaget, 1952), 
is based on 182 observations made from only three children, in this case, his own. 
Piaget's deep faith in the method of critical observation, which he terms "the 
clinical method" (Piaget, 1929), is seen in his rejection of statistical findings 
presented by Charles Buhler in preference for observational evidence presented 
by C. W. Valentine, observations which, incidentally, agree with Piaget's. 
Piaget (1952, p. 72) writes, "But an acute observation, especially when made 
by as good an observer as C. W. Valentine, surpasses all statistics." Maier 
(1965, p. 83) commented on Piaget's attitude toward methodology by saying, 
". . . Piaget sees empirical research as a tool to substantiate or to refute 
facts which were previously established by logic. " American psychologists, 
who by in large have been strongly infleunced by behavioral psychology, have 
difficulty in accommodating this attitude. 
The typical Piagetian experiment starts with the presentation of a task 
calling for a decision by the child. The experimenter will ask questions of the 
subject and follow the response with additional inquiries in order to trace the 
subject's process of reasoning to its end. This procedure, due to its nature, 
differs from the more empirical, invariant interview. 
Perhaps due to the nature of Piaget's methodology, he does not attempt 
to be predictive , but rather to be descriptive of the subject's thought process 
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(Flavell, 1963). While many behavioral scientists feel somewhat uncomfortable 
at Piaget's strong reliance upon subjective observation and his lack of rigid 
experimental control (Dodwell, 1961; Gilmore, 1964), few if any question his 
observational skills and the integrity of his objectivity . Perhaps Pratt ( 1933) 
represents an extreme in this criticism of Piaget, stating that his theories are 
but "little removed from ordinary literary speculati on" (Pratt, 1933; quoted 
from Berlyne, 1957, p. 1), while Dodwell (1961, p. 35) supports Piaget's 
"clinical method" as yielding "real insight into the cognitive processes . " 
Piaget's Stages of Cognitive Development 
In reviewing the literature dealing with the stages of cognitive growth as 
conceived by Piaget, one is immediately confronted with a variety of presentations . 
For example, Berlyne (1957), Maier (1965), and Morgan and King (1966) present 
five stages: 1. the sensory-motor stage; 2. the preconceptual stage; 3. the 
intuitive thought stage; 4. the concrete operations stage; and 5. the formal 
operations stage. Hilgard and Atkinson (1967) and Kamii U967), following Segil 
( 1964), present the intuitive thought phase as a subsection of preoperational 
thought and thus present only four periods of cognitive development: 1. the 
sensory-motor period; 2. the preoperational thought period; 3. the period of 
concrete operations; and 4. the period of formal operations. Flavell (1963), in 
his excellent analysis of Piagetian theory, presents only three stages of cogni-
tive development, but has several important subsections or stages: 1. the 
period of sensory-motor intelligence; 2. the period of preparation for and 
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organization of concrete operations, sub sectioned by preoperational repre-
sentations and concrete operations; and 3. the period of formal operations. 
Such variety of grouping is not uncommon even in the various writings of 
Piaget himself, who evidently looks upon his stages as "abstractions" or con-
structs, not as "concrete immutables." (Flavell, 1963, p. 86, footnote) 
In Piaget's most recent encounter with American psychologists, his 
lectures in March of 1964 at Cornell University and the University of California 
(Ripple and Rockcastle, 1964), he spoke of cognitive development as comprising 
four basic stages: 1. sensory-motor or pre-verbal stage; 2. preoperational 
stage; 3. concrete operations stage; and 4. formal or hypothetic ... deductive 
operations stage. This writer will follow the pattern set by the majority of 
Piagetian reviewers and consider five stages in cognitive development. 
Stage One: Sensory-motor stage 
The sensory-motor stage spans the period of growth from birth to age 
two. Covering, as it does, a period which involves considerable modification 
in the neonate's physical appearance and development and its cognitive and 
emotional responses, of necessity it must be subdivided into smaller phases. 
Piaget presents six subdivisions to this first period of cognitive growth (Piaget, 
1952; Flavell, 1963; Maier, 1965). In general the sensory-motor stage covers 
that period in which the infant at first does not distinguish between himself and 
his environment, but responds to stimuli with his inherited, reflexive equip-
ment. This phase is somewhat comparable to Sullivan'sprototaxic mode of 
cognition (Sullivan, 1953). Gradually, the infant comes to recognize objects 
as separate from himself and develops new ways of dealing with his environ-
ment. 
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The first subphase of stage one describes the reflexive disposition of 
the infant during the first month of life. The first reflexive action to gain 
prominent recognition in the infant is that of sucking (Piaget, 1952). Piaget 
sees in the primitive act of sucking the beginnings of psychic organization 
because in the sucking process, which is directed by searching on the part of 
the infant, the young organism finds meaning. Flavell ( 1963) points out that 
during this first month of life there is an absence of genuine intelligent 
behavior: assimilation and accommodation are identical or undifferentiated . 
Growing out of the reflexive substage comes the second of the sub-
divisions , the period of acquired adaptations and of primary circular reactions, 
covering as it does ages one to four months. The basic schemas established 
in phase one are expanded to form rudimentary habits and to accommodate new 
experiences in the environment. Piaget's phrase "primary circular reactions" 
describes theinfant's attempt to repeat non-intentional responses , thus forming 
action units or habits (Mairer, 1965). Flavell (1963, p. 93) uses the term 
"rhythmic cycle" to describe this phenomena. During the present subphase 
of growth the infant has established several schemas; primary circular reactions 
are either incorporated into these presently existing schemas or form new ones 
(Piaget, 1952), The schema of vision, which expands in function as the infant 
matures, will serve as an example: At first the infant passivley and reflexively re-
sp ond s to visual stimulation; second, there is a circular reaction in which the infant 
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more actively "looks"--makes an attempt to follow objects with his eyes; and 
third, there is an intercoordination between the schema of looking and the 
schema of hearing, touching and grasping (Piaget, 1952). The use of the term 
"intercoordination" is not to imply that the various schemas in the child's 
cognitive repertory are well coordinated, but only that they are mentally associ-
ated. 
The third subphase, which spans months four to eight, may be described 
as that of "secondary circular reaction and procedures for making interesting 
sights last." (Piaget, 1952), p . 76). This aspect of sensory-motor development 
is a continuation of and an expansion of the preceding phase . In the phase of 
primary circular reaction, the 17rhymthic cycle" centered in the infant him-
self; in the present phase, repetitions extend beyond the bounds of self to 
participation in the environment. Flavell (1963) aptly described this period by 
stating: 
The child of the third stage . . . is much more interested in 
the environmental consequences of his acts, the secondary 
circular reaction consisting precisely in attempts to maintain , 
through repetition , an interesting change in the milieu adven-
titiously produced by his own action. • . . In a general way, 
it can be said that the primary circular reaction is more 
autocentric, more centered on its own functioning , and the 
secondary circular reaction more allocentric , more oriented 
outward beyond the confines of the self . . . thus it is that the 
first real exploration of the outside world begins . (Flavell, 
1963, pp. 103-103) 
Another aspect of the present phase of the sensory-motor stage is what 
Piaget (1952, p . 186) terms "motor recognition." Perhaps Piaget's own words 
can best illustrate this phenomena of motor response to visual and auditory 
stimuli: 
At 0;6 ( 12) Lucienne perceives from a distance two celluloid 
parrots attached to a chandelier and which she had sometimes 
had in her bassinet. As soon as she sees them, she definitely 
but briefly shakes her legs without trying to act upon them 
from a distance. This can only be a matter of motor recog-
nition. So too, at 0;6 (19) it suffices that she catches sight of 
her dolls from a distance from her to outline the movement 
of swinging them with her. (Piaget, 1952, p. 105) 
Finally, the third phase presently being discussed reveals the 
precursors of what will appear in the next, that is "intentionality" (Piaget, 
1952, p. 47)--the purposeful pursuit of a desired goal. 
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Piaget's fourth subphase of sensory-motor development is charac-
terized by further coordination of secondary schemas and their application to 
new situations. This is the phase during which the infant comes to recognize 
goals and seeks to find means in achieving them. Piaget illustrates this point 
by noting that his subject, when shown a desired matchbox (goal), would strike 
Piaget's hand, which served as an obstacle preventing the subject from reach-
ing the goal, or would try to draw in the matchbox by pushing the hand (Piaget, 
1952). Such responses are viewed by Piaget as the first "clear sign" of 
intentional behavior. 
Another sign of cognitive development witnessed during this subphase, 
which generally takes place between the ages eight to twelve months, is that of 
recognizing signs to anticipate coming events. For example, the child may 
begin to cry when he sees his mother put on her coat, the coat in this case 
serving as a sign to the young child that his mother is about to leave. 
The present subphase is also characterized by a concerted effort on 
the part of the infant to "understand" and adapt to his environment in a heretofore 
unparrelled manner. Piaget (1952) writes: 
On the other hand, when the s.:..month-old child examines a 
cigarette case or a hanging necktie everything transpires as 
though such objects presented a problem to his mind , as 
though he were trying to "understand. " Not only does he 
look at such objects for a much longer time than the 4- to 
5-month-old child before proceeding to act, but furthermore, 
he engages in an ensemble of exploratory movements relating 
to the object and not to himself. He feels, explores the sur-
face, the edges, turns over and slowly displaces, etc. , and 
the last behavior patterns are very significant of a new atti-
tude. The unfamiliar obviously represents to the child an 
external reality, to which he must adapt himself and no 
longer a substance which is pliable at will or a simple ail-
ment for the activity itself. Finally comes the application 
of habitual schemata to this reality. But in trying out each 
of his schemata in turn, the child at this stage gives more 
the impression of making an experiment than of generalizing 
his behavior patterns: he tries to "understand . " (Piaget , 
1952, p. 259) 
During the infant's twelfth to eighteenth month, the fifth substage of 
sensory-motor development is seen. The fifth substage may be described as 
an experience of "the tertiary circular reaction" and "the discovery of new 
means by active experimentation." (Flavell, 1963, p. 113; Maier, 1965, p. 
102) While there is no sharp dividing line between the secondary and the 
tertiary circular reactions, in the first case the infant only dimly sees the 
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difference between his actions and their results; he repeats his · behavior rather 
mechanically, or "mindlessly," as Flavell (1963, p. 114) puts it. In the 
tertiary circular reaction, the infant becomes aware that his actions produce 
some alteration in the object being handled. Therefore, it is "repetition 
with variation" (Flavell, 1963, p. 114) in order to see the affects of the variation. 
Piaget (1952, p. 267) calls this experience "experiment in order to see" and 
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states that the infant discovers "fluctuations in the results." 
Flavell ( 1963) stressed two significant points for the tertiary circular 
reactions. The phenomena indicates: 1. a considerable differentiation between 
assimilation and accommodation; and 2. a cognitive movement away from the 
autocentric towards the allocentric orientation. 
In summary, during the fifth substage, the child discovers new means 
of adjusting to his environment through active participation in trial-and-error 
procedures called tertiary circular reactions. 
Substage six, covering ages eighteen months to twenty-four months, 
is very similar to the preceeding substage with one major difference: Whereas 
in substage five, the child solves new situations through t:ti:al-and-error overt 
behavior, in the present substage this process is internalized to become covert. 
This process of internal experimentation Piaget ( 1963, p. 120) calls "symbolic 
images." Of this new internalization Flavell ( 1963, p. 121) stated, "The nature 
of invention .. . can be stated simply: it consists of reciprocal assimilation, 
the representations of the various schemas involved in the act to be performed." 
Maier (1965, p. 107) concluded that the child is now able to "envisage himself 
as the potential cause or initiator of action." 
Stage Two: The preconceptual stage 
While Piaget does not devote as much of his energies to a description 
of the preconceptual stage, ages two to four, as he does to the sensory-motor 
stage, he views the present phase of development as highly significant: The 
child has now acquired the rudiments of intellectual functioning, though 
heretofore applied in only an autistic manner, and begins now to extend his 
cognitive energies in the processes of socialization (Maier, 1965). 
The cognitive disposition during this stage is said to be egocentric. 
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Berlyne (1957, p. 11) pointed out that while adults may think either deductively 
or inductively, children of this age think "transductively from the particular 
to the particular. " 
Along with extensive investigations of his environment, the young 
child acquires new or expanded means of communication. Word symbols, how-
ever , along with other environmental experiences, are personalized and do not 
have the conceptual meanings found in the adult world. "Mama," for example , 
may have the personalized meaning of "I need soim thing, " and not necessarily 
refer to the child's mother as a person (Flavell, 1963, p. 155) . 
Play, which became an active means of assimilation during the latter 
phase of sensory-motor development, now is the all consuming activity of the 
child . Play becomes the chief means of adaptation; since all experience is 
viewed subjectively during this period, the child is able to translate all experi-
ence with his environment into play activities (Piaget, 1962), It is interesting 
to note that since the child of this stage of development has no conception of 
"to win," as long as he plays a game successfully, he is "a winner" (Maier, 
1965, p. 115). 
The preconceptual nature of the child's thought process is perhaps 
nowhere better illustrat:ed than when the child attempts to make judgments in 
relationship to space and matter. For example, the child's subjective 
"feelings" about quantity prevent him from "seeing" (perceiving) that equal 
amounts of milk placed in glasses of different sizes remain equal. His 
judgments are distorted by his subjectivity. The child is unable to conceive 
of both qualitative and quantitative aspects of substances at once (Wohlwill, 
1967). 
Because the principle of imitation has now become quite active, the 
child experiences strong feelings of identification, usually sterning from an 
attitude of awe regarding his parents. Identification becomes the foundation 
force for future development of conscience and value judgments. 
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Flavell ( 1963) focused on several characteristic weaknesses of the 
preconceptual period . First, it is a time of egocentrism. While the child 
becomes more cognizant of his environment than ever before, he conceives of 
environment from only one point of view--his own; he cannot consider experi-
ences from the vantage point of others. Also, when viewing an object from 
point A, the child cannot describe what the object will look like from point B . 
The second characteristic weakness referred to by Flavell is "centration," 
meaning that the child experiences a distortion of reality due to his inability 
to consider several aspects of an experience at once. "Like the young sensory-
motor infant in the field of direct action, the preconceptional child is confined 
to the surface of the phenomena he tries to think about , assimilating only 
those superficial features which clamor loudest for his attention. " (Flavell 
1963, p. 157) Third, the child of this stage of development must focus on 
"stages" and not "transformations. " He is unable to follow progressions , to 
conceive of substances undergoing change, but views transformations, not as a 
progression, but as a set of static stages. To borrow an expression from 
Kamii and Radin (1967, p. 322), " ... their intelligence functions like dis-
connected slides rather than like moving pictures. " Fourth, the child's 
cognitive development is at a stage of "irreversibility," therefore inflexible 
and immobile. To reverse a thought pattern and return to the starting point 
is beyond the child's cognitive abilities. Fifth, the child's mental capacity 
does not have a stable degree of equilibrium; the process of assimilation and 
accommodation cannot sustain itself but is defective. And sixth, the child of 
this age is unable to form concepts and to produce logical reasoning. 
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In summary of the preconceptual stage , it should be pointed out that 
its chief characteristic is that of representational thought. Whereas in the 
sensory-motor stage the child's basic cognitive characteristic was that of 
"motoric actions," he is now able to represent his environment and his feelings 
with mental constructions or images, called by Piaget the "symbolic functions" 
(Flavell, 1963, p. 151). This more advanced cognitive state enables memory 
to function and thus enables the child to apply his past experience to his present 
situation. In the sensory-motor stage the child responds to his environment 
with his whole organism; in the preconceptual stage he begins to respond with 
his mind. In the sensory-motor stage the child is born to the world; in the 
preconceptual stage the world is born to the child. 
Stage Three: The intuitive thought stage 
The stage of intuitive thought, ages four to seven, as pointed out by 
Piaget ( 1957), is a continuation or extension of the stage of preconceptual 
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thought. Flavell ( 1963, p. 86), in his somewhat exhaustive analysis of Piaget's 
theory, did not once refer to the "intuitive thought stage," but treated the 
experience of this age as an indivisible unit with the pre conceptual phase, 
jointly calling them "the period of preparation for organization of concrete 
operations." Because many of the chief characteristics of both the precon-
ceptual and the intuitive thought stages may be looked upon as non-cognitive 
or quasicognitive in nature (e.g., identification, socialization, verbalization, 
etc.), these two stages may be thought of as the "cognitive latency" period, 
that stage in which the child readies himself for more realistic cognitive 
interaction with his environment . 
Maier (1965), who treated the intuitive thought stage with considerable 
detail, also stressed that this period is a continuation of the preceeding one 
and pointed out what he considered significant about this time of development. 
First, the intuitive thought stage is a period of widening awareness: Socially, 
the child's physical, emotional and intellectual development permits increased 
interaction with adults and peers. This social responsiveness tends to decrease 
egocentricity, though certainly not to the point of extinction. Linguisitically, 
the child's vocabulary increases, his ability to express himself improves, and 
his word meaning is broadened. Speech, however, is still egocentric for the 
preschool child. Vygotsky (1962) confirmed Piaget's (1932, p. 56; quoted from 
Vygotsky, 1962, p. 15) accuracy in describing the typical child of this period 
when the latter said, "One might say that an adult thinks socially even when he 
is alone, and the child under seven thinks and speaks egocentrically even in the 
society of others." Generally , in the intuitive thought stage there is an 
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upgrading of the previous thought processes, though the principle of centricity 
continues to prevail. The child is still preoccupied with part~ rather than 
wholes. 
Logistically, the child makes his first attempts to apply principles of 
logic to his environment. Erroneously, however, he views and judges quantity 
or mass on the basis of proximity or spatial relatedness. For example, when 
viewing two equal rows of beans arranged in parallel order, the child "reasons" 
or intuitively perceives that they are equal in quantity or mass. When, how-
ever, one row of beans is spread apart so as to be longer , the child reasons 
that the spatial increase must mean greater quantity . "The child judges by a 
single, usually spatial, clue. His reasoning proceeds from the premise to the 
conclusion in a single jump," wrote Maier (1965, p. 117). Berlyne (1957) 
pointed out that during the intuitive thought stage single perceptions still 
dominate ("centering") so that in contrast to the adult who is able to take into 
account several aspects of a situation, the child focusses on one aspect and 
overlooks the others. 
Second, also prominent in the intuitive thought stage is what Piaget(1929) 
calls the "immediate, illegitimate generalization." The child generalizes that 
the hero of the story is always "good," that night is always "black," and that 
day is "light. " Shades of value are not comprehended. Simplification remains 
a cognitive necessity. When glimmers of relativity do appear in the child's 
thinking, they are always related to one object and never associated or trans-
ferred to general classes of items (Piaget, 1952). 
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The child's play of this period serves as an effective index of his 
increased cognitive development. While not yet free from its egocentric 
center, play takes on social overtones (Piaget, 1962). During the pre con-
ceptual stage the child, in his · own mind, "becomes" the sheriff when he puts 
on the sheriff's badge. In the present period the child plays "as if" he were 
the sheriff, the difference being that he now more clearly understands his own 
identity. Because the child can now conceive of others apart from himself, he 
plays "make believe" games (Piaget, 1962). The zenith of play experience 
during this stage is seen in the child's increased social cooperativeness. 
Games now become group experiences; the child gradually learns to follow 
collective rules. Ludie play, or play for the sake of play itself, decreases and 
and realistic play increases, gradually to become in future periods parallel 
with reality, thus being equal with work (Maier, 1965). Whereas previously 
the child accommodated and assimilated through ludic play, he now begins to 
find equilibration through work. 
In terms of moral values and commitments, the child now begins to 
separate the moral commands and the objects associated with the commands. 
Heretofore, the child's concept of "mother" and "you must obey mother" have 
been one. Absolutes begin to be tempered by relativity in thought , though this 
process does not reach fruition during the present stage of development. 
Though the investigation of Kooistra ( 1963) indicated that a number of 
American children begin to grasp intuitively principles of conservation during 
this period, ages five through seven, Piaget and Inhelder (1941; quoted from 
Hilgard and Atkinson, 1967) found this untrue, at least for their subjects, 
holding that conservation of mass, weight and volume does not commence 
until the next stage. 
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Morgan and King (1966) summarize the intuitive stage by pointing out: 
1. The child begins during this period to form classes of objects--for example, 
dogs and cats are grouped as animals; 2. Egocentricity continues as previously 
experienced; 3. Children of this stage do not conserve; 4. Children of this age 
group cannot formulate "generalizations" from experiences; and 5. Centricity 
continues to dominate over transformation, meaning that the child focuses on 
separate stages, not progressive transformations of events or experiences. 
Stage Four: Concrete operations stage 
While Flavell (1963, p. 86) treated the period of concrete operations , 
ages seven to eleven, as a subperiod of his phase two, "the period of preparation 
for and organization of concrete operations," most writers (Berlyne, 1957; 
Hilgard and Atkinson, 1967; Maier, 1965; Morgan and King, 1966) and Piaget 
(Ripple and Rockcastle, 1964) himself look upon this stage of cognitive develop-
ment as separate from the others. The significant aspect of concrete oper-
ations is to be discovered in the term "operations" itself. For Piaget, an 
operation is achieved when a level of cognitive sophistication is reached within 
mental actions or activities. When the child experiences a degree of cohesive-
ness within his system of mental representations, so that equilibration without 
hesitation is present, he has reached the level of operations. Operations signify 
that the child is cognitively functioning in closely knit, mental totalities; structure 
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has been achieved and regulates or balances assimilation and accommodation. 
" . . . any representational act which is an integral part of an organized net-
work of related acts is an operations." (Flavell, 1963, p. 166) "Operational 
thought refers to the mental capacity to order and relate experience to an organized 
whole." (Maier , 1965, p. 125) Operations are present in all numerical function-
ing, advanced value judgments, and logical, mental classifications (Berlyne, 
1957). Flavell (1963, p. 164, footnote) adequately described this stage by 
saying, ". . . the essence of the subperiod is the acquisition of a well-structured 
and coherent framework within which to represent and operate upon the concrete, 
perceivable world of things and events." 
While a child of ages seven to eleven masters many types of cognitive 
operations or systems of functioning, his mental operations are still closely tied 
to his concrete perceptions. A child of this age cannot yet perform abstract 
reasoning. 
Berlyne (1957), Hilgard and Atkinson (1966), and Maier (1965) pointed 
out several major characteristics of cognitive life during this phase of develop-
ment. One, the "awareness of reversibility" is gradually achieved. Reversi-
bility refers to the free possibility of returning to the starting point of a mental 
operation (Piaget, 1958). The child, having previously been conscious only of 
parts and not of wholes, now perceives that parts are synthesized into wholes. 
Parts are now classified into wholes and wholes into still greater units: 
hierarchical systems of classification are developed. 
Two, while heretofore the child has been dominated by either the 
process of assimilation or accommodation, a greater degree of equilibration 
now pervades his mental functioning. The child is now cognitively stable 
enough to consider alternate solutions to a problem without the necessity of 
committing himself to any one (Flavell, 1963). 
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Third, the child becomes aware of the logic of conservation, first 
mastering the appraisal of lengths, then weights, and finally volumes (Elkind, 
1961; Flavell, 1963), 
Fourth, the child's concept of time, heretofore being limited to "before" 
and "after" concepts, now matures to include "past," "present," and "future" 
and becomes independent of perceptual data. The child becomes aware that 
an hour of "work" is the same as an hour of "play" (Maier, 1965). 
The concrete operational period was characterized by Flavell (1963, 
p. 204) as having three major limitations: 1. Thought process remains grounded 
to the concrete and the immediate; 2. The various mental systems which develop 
during this period are splintered or unintegrated; and 3. Growing out of the 
previous limitations, the child " ... has to vanquish the various physical 
properties of objects and events (mass, weight, length, area, time, etc.) one 
by one because his cognitive instruments are insufficiently 'formal,' insuffici-
ently detached and dissociated from the subject matter they bear upon, to 
permit a content-free, once-for-all structureing." 
In speaking of the contrast between the present period, that of concrete 
operations, and previous stages of growth, Flavell's comment also serves as 
an additional summary of the present stage: 
It is simply that the older child seems to have at his command 
a coherent and integrated cognitive system with which he organi-
zes and manipulates the world around him. Much more than his 
younger counterpart, he gives the decided impression of possess-
ing a solid cognitive bedrock, something flexible and plastic and 
yet consistent and enduring, with which he can structure the 
present in terms of the past without undue strain and dislocation, 
that is, without the ever-present tendency to tumble into the 
perplexity and contradiction which mark the preschooler. Re-
stated in Piaget's lexicon, the concrete-operational child behaves 
in a wide variety of tasks as though a rich and integrated assimi-
lating organization were functioning in equilibrium or balance with 
a finely tuned, discriminative, accommodatory mechanism . 
(Flavell, 1963, p. 165) 
Stage Five: Formal operation stage 
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Piaget's final stage, that of formal operations, age elev en to fifteen , 
represents the zenith of cognitive maturation , not that the individual automati-
cally reaches fullness on every level of mental functioning, but that he now 
enters into the final phase of intellectual development . Between the ages of 
eleven and fifteen, the young adolescent begins to experience for the first time 
the capacity to do abstract thinking. He begins to delight "especially in con-
sideration of what is not" (Maier , 1965, p. 135), the "possible" rather than 
the "real" (Flavell, 1963 , p . 204). His world of ideas, formerly composed 
of either "black" or "white," becomes for him a "wonderful world of color." 
Equilibrium replaces the process of assimilation and accommodation and 
becomes an unconscious and spontaneous process (Maier, 1965). 
The youth's new ability to comprehend geometric relationships and 
proportions transforms his feelings for social relations (Maier, 1965). Balance 
and relativity become imminent. Reality is no longer limited to the concrete or 
visible. The thought process is no longer limited to a "horizontal" plane, 
but is now extended to include other relationships. While he does not lose 
his interest in minute detail, he becomes increasingly concerned with broad 
issues. His value system is extended, and his view of himself as a part of 
a single family is widened to include all of society--humanity itself (Maier, 
1956). For the first time the youth is able to consider a multiplicity of ideas 
without fully committing himself to any one. In short, the youth has entered 
the realm of intellectual maturity. 
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Cognition, which began as a reflexive expression of the physiological 
organism, has grown, not to be separate from this organism, but to be equal 
to it . 
More specifically, analysts of Piagetian theory (Flavell , 1963; Maier , 
1965; Hunt, 1961) have pointed out three major characteristics of formal 
operations. One, the adolescent's thinking is "hypothetico-deductive" (Flavell, 
1963, p. 205; Maier, 1965, p. 136-137; Piaget, 1957, p. 19). The adolescent 
is able to see a multiplicity of "possible" solutions or outcomes when consider-
ing "real" data of life. Two, formal operational thinking is "propositional 
thinking" (Flavell, 1961, p . 205; Maier, 1965, p. 135). In the concrete-
operational period the youngster was concerned with the raw data of his 
environment; in the present stage he advanced by combining this factual 
data into propositions or generalizations and then proceeds to make logical 
connections, implications, disjunctions, etc. between propositions. ". 
he develops concepts of concepts." (Maier, 1965, p. 138) Third, the 
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adolescent now subjects " ... variables to a combinational analysis." (Flavell, 
1963, p. 206) The young adult mind now seeks out all possible combinations 
of facts, generalizations and classifications in order to arrive at the most 
suitable solution(s) to the problems at hand. In short, the adolescent mind 
is now capable of scientific reasoning. 
Flavell summarized the present stage by saying: 
We see, then, that formal thought is for Piaget not so much 
this or that specific behavior as it is a generalized orientation, 
sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit, towards problem-
solving; an orientation towards organizing data ( combinational 
analysis), towards isolation and control of variables, towards 
the hypothetical, and towards logical justification and proof. 
(Flavell, 1963, p. 211) 
In summary of Piaget's theory of cognitive development 
Henry Maier (1965, pp. 141-143) has quite adequately reviewed Piaget's 
basic teachings of cognitive growth. That which follows is a pr6cis of Maier's 
summary: 
1. All cognitive development proceeds in identical sequence. 
2. All developmental phenomena reflect a natural trend of change from 
the simple to an ever-increasing complexity. 
3. Each developmental aspect begins with concrete experience and 
proceeds toward the mastery of its corresponding abstraction. 
4. Personality development proceeds from experience with the "physical 
world" and progresses to the social world and finally to the "ideational world. " 
5. Personality begins in egocentric orientation, moves into objectivity, 
and ends in relativity. 
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6. Cognitive behavior evolves from first "doing, " to "doing knowingly, 11 
and then to "conceptualization. " 
7. Objects are viewed first for their use, then their permanency, their 
representative symbol, their place in space, their properties and finally for 
their relativity in space, time and utility. 
8. The development of cognition modifies the individual's early feelings 
of "animism" which are attributed to all action. 
9. Conscience, which is at first related to complete adherence to adult 
authority, develops into social reciprocity and integrity. 
10. Previous deve ,lopmental acquisitions are retained as active ingredients 
throughout life. 
Piaget's Contribution to the Study of Mental Imagery 
While Piaget and his associates have led in the investigation of mental 
structures and their development, they have only recently come to the study of 
imagery (Flavell, 1963; Ripple and Rockcastle, 1963). Thus far neither Piaget 
nor the learning theorists who seek to duplicate and extend his studies have 
published significant works on imagery. Flavell' s ( 1963) 450 page review of 
Piaget's theories and experiments, which covers the work up to 1960, devotes 
only two paragraphs to Piaget's efforts in understanding imagery (Flavell, 1963, 
p. 358). Maier (1965) makes no reference to this aspect of Piaget's studies. 
The nearest that Piaget himself has come to a treatise on mental imagery has 
been his _Pl~, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood (1962), in which he considers 
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the relation of imagery to imitation and play. 
Thus far Piaget's unique contribution to the study of imagery has been 
in his analysis of its genesis. Rejecting, as he does, the traditional hypothesis 
that imagery is the "mere reactivations of traces of past experience" (Berlyne, 
1957, p. 166; Piaget, 1962), Piaget reasons that imagery evolves as a necessary 
and integral part of the child's process of imitation. During the sensory-motor 
phase of growth , the child evidences definite imitative behavior. At first this 
behavior consists of what Piaget calls "immediate imitation" (Piaget, 1962, p. 
63) or "exterior imitation," (Piaget, 1962, pp. 63-64): in order to imitate, the 
child requires direct confrontation with the subject or experience being imitated. 
Piaget writes, "Obs. 42. At 1;1(23) L . carefully watched me swinging my 
watch which I held by the end of the chain. As soon as I put it down, she 
imitated me. . .. " (Piaget, 1962, p. 54) A~ this stage of development the 
child experiences no mental imagery, no cognitive representations or 
symbolism. Later, however, during the sixth or last subphase of the 
sensory-motor period, from age ten to eighteen months, the child does not 
require immediacy for imitation; he repeats patterns observed in others 
several hours or even days previously. This phenomena Piaget ( 1962, p. 70) 
terms "deferred imitation." Exterior imitation, requiring as it does immediacy 
of the object being imitated, thus becomes "interiorised imitation. " This, of 
course, necessitates the presence of mental representation or memory images. 
Piaget contends that imagery is not present before deferred imitation, 
but follows deferred imitation as a necessary complement to this phenomena . 
Mental imagery, therefore, is the "interiorisation" of external or deferred 
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imitation . Piaget ( 1962, p. 71) writes, "It is therefore clear that in such a 
reaction representative imitation does not follow the image, but precedes it, 
the interior symbol thus being a product of interiorisation and not a new factor 
from some other source. " Just as interior language (silent speech) evolves 
as the product of and complement to exterior (spoken) language, so mental 
imagery evolves from and complements internalized imitation. ·Later, as the 
child develops into new stages of cognitive growth, imagery becomes independent 
of deferred imitation and precedes it, becoming "representative imitation" 
(Piaget, 1962, p. 279). 
Piaget anticipates that the thoughtful reader may object to his hypothesis 
of the origin of imagery by inquiring about childhood dreams, which of necessity 
would require mental imagery. If children are able to dream before the experi -
ence of deferred imitation, then imagery precedes the internalization of imitation 
and is not the necessary product of it. Piaget writes: 
In the case of children, we have been unable to find evidence 
of authentic dreams before the appearance of language. At 
about the age of ten months, J. used regularly to smile in her 
sleep when I went close to her face and laughed, but it is 
unlikely that there was any mental image because the phenom-
enon, instead of becoming more frequent, gradually ceased. 
The first definite proof of dreams in the children we have 
observed came between ages of 1;9 and 2, when the children 
talked in their sleep and gave an account of the dreams 
when they woke. (Piaget, 1962, p. 177) 
During Piaget's 1964 visit to Cornell University and the University of 
California, he devoted one of his lectures to the presentation of his more recent 
investigation of imagery (Ripple and Rockcastle, 1964). Having satisfied his 
scientific curiosity regarding the genesis of imagery, Piaget has turned his 
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interests to the part that imagery plays in cognitive operations, primarily the 
conservation of mass, weight and volume. In recent experimentation with 
imagery, Piaget has utilized the basic procedures employed in his conservation 
experiments. The child is presented objects, for example, two equal balls of 
clay, and asked to imagine which object will contain more clay if one is dis-
torted into a pancake shape. The same experiment has utilized differently 
shaped glasses into which the child is asked to visualize equal amounts of 
liquid being poured. The subject is hereby forced to employ a type of 
projective mental imagery to solve a problem. 
In connection with the above experimentation, Piaget points out two 
types of imagery in children: One , called 0 reproductive imagery" (Ripple 
and Rockcastle, 1964, p. 31), is common among younger children, under 
the age of seven. Inhelder (1966, p. 316) used the term "static imagery" for 
somewhat the same concept. Reproductive imagery enables the child to dupli-
cate within his mind what he has perceptually experienced in the past. This 
type of imagery is limited to past experience and does not therefore permit 
accurate estimates of transformations. Two, "anticipatory imagery" (Ripple 
and Rockcastle , 1964, p. 31), which becomes operative at about age seven and 
after enables the child to make logical predictions about future states, i.e. , 
transformations of matter. Piaget points out that anticipatory imagery does 
not facilitate mental operations (conservation), but that operations facilitate 
anticipatory imagery. The child is able to experience anticipatory imagery 
only after his mental structures have developed to permit operations, that is, 
to grasp the principles of conservation. 
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While Piaget stresses that experimentation is still somewhat limited, 
he feels that imagery functions in relation to intelligence through the develop-
ment and exercise of the child's imitative capacity. Operations, on the other 
hand, function not in connection with intelligence per se, but with mental 
structures. 
While children under age seven accurately utilize vivid imaginations, 
they are still unable to grasp conservation. After age seven, imagery and 
operations complement each other. Therefore, Piaget concludes that there 
is no connection between imagery and operations before age seven (Ripple 
and Rockcastle, 1964). The problem of non-conservation or non-operations 
is not one of imagerial weakness . Imagery is only a small part of the 
child's "mental structure" which governs operational thought. 
In summary, Piaget does not conceive of imagery as being a primordial 
mental structure leading the way to cognitive fulfillment. Rather, imagery is 
viewed as a product of the child's internalization of imitation. Imagery is a tool, 
which while growing to a place of great importance in cognitive life, is utilized 
to facilitate other cognitive processes. 
The Heuristic Effects of Piaget's Theories 
Even a cursory survey of the Psychological Abstract for the past fifteen 
years will reveal the heuristic effect of Piaget's theories of child development. 
In the present section of this dissertation the writer proposes to present the 
findings of those studies which he feels pertinent to the review of Piaget's 
theories of cognition and the present investigation. Studies in replication, 
extension, and analysis of certain variables involved in conservation experi-
ments will be considered. 
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Unfortunately, investigators have, by in large, "followed" Piaget's 
experiments and have not fully explored areas which his theories and investi-
gations have suggested but not fully expounded. One such area is that of mental 
imagery. It would be expected that Piaget's forthcoming publication on mental 
imagery (Flavell, 1963) will result in expanded research in this area. At 
present, however, the writer is unable to locate pertinent studies relating 
imagery to Piaget's theories of cognitive development. 
Studies replicating and extending Piaget's experiments 
Dodwell (1960, 1961), Estes (1956), and Elkind (1961) have duplicated 
areas of Piaget's conservation experiments with interesting results. Estes 
(1956), replicating Piaget's analysis of the stages in young children's develop-
ment of number concepts, examined the responses of fifty-tw'O children, ages 
four, five and six, and concluded that Piaget was incorrect. In fact, Estes 
found "no stages'' at all in the development of number concept among her 
subjects. Dodwell (1960) , however, criticized Estes' experimental design, 
suggesting that she was ill prepared in her grasp of Piagetian theory and experi-
mentation and that her study encompassed too small an N on which to base a 
rejection of Piaget's findings. 
Dodwell (1960), using an N of 250, studied numerical concepts among 
children in kindergarten, first, and second grades, ages five through eight. 
Dodwell confirmed Piaget's tenet that young children, even though they may 
be able to count, do not understand the concept of number. His analysis 
indicated that stages of number concept do exist. 
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In a second study, Dodwell ( 1961) devised and standardized individual 
and group tests of number concept acquisition for children ages five through 
eight. Experimentation with Dodwell' s tests led him to conclude: 1. Stages 
of number concept acquisition do exist; 2. While Piaget is "generally" correct 
in his presentation of chronological ages for the various stages in number 
conception, he is too specific in delineating age groupings. Dodwell found what 
might be called a "diffusion" effect--children may be in several stages at one 
time, thus making rigid grouping inaccurate. This same conclusion was reached 
by Lovell and Ogilvie ( 1960), who stressed that their subjects often vacillated 
between conservation and non-conservation. Dodwell surmised, in agreement 
with Harker ( 1960), whom he quotes, that the "lack of neatness" or rigid stages 
in his study may have been due to individual differences in childhood experi-
ences. 
Studies of variables influencing conservation acquisition 
Piaget has been criticized on the basis of inadequate analysis of signifi-
cant variables influencing his findings. Investigators have, therefore, sought 
to analyze the effects of reinforcement and/or instruction, sex, intelligence, 
and mental age in replicating Piaget's experiments in conservation. Smedslund 
( 1961a, 1961b), hypothesizing that conservation could be acquired through rein-
forcement (Ripple and Rockcastle, 1964), concluded after experimentation with 
five to seven-year-old children that concepts of conservation are acquired 
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through "inner equilibration" ( 1961a , pp. 71-72) and that the traditional learn-
ing theories of association and reinforcement are not sufficient in the master y 
of the principles of conservation. This conclusion, of course, is an agreement 
with Piaget (Ripple and Rockcastle , 1964). 
Smedslund's conclusion may be weakened, however, due to inadequate 
experimental design: Smedslund's three groups, comprising a total of forty-
eight five- to se ven-year-olds , were not well matched according to pretest 
scores. Also, Smedslund's posttest , which served as an indicator of conser-
vation acquisition , follo wed only two brief periods of instruction (reinforcement). 
It would appear then that conclusions based on such short term reinforcement 
might be inadequately founded. Certainly neither Pavlov nor Skinner achieved 
significant r esults with such brief periods of training. 
In a se cond experim ent Smedslund (1961b) confirmed his original find-
ings, that formal instruction is inadequate in conservation acquisition, by 
emplo ying a te st of ex tin ction to two groups of children, one which had naturally 
acquired conservation a s shown on a pretest , and one which had not. Non-
conservers again recei ved only two periods of instruction. Smedslund's test 
of extinction consisted of "t r icking" his subjects. For example, two equal 
balls of cl ay were presented . While one ball of clay was being distorted so as 
to appear larg er , the exa min er secretly added additional clay. When the clay 
was placed on a balanc e, a "correct" answer was shown to be "incorrect. " 
Persistently correct answers , in face of negative reinforcement, was judged 
as an indication of depth understanding of conservation concepts. Smedslund 
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found that all the subjects who " acquired a notion of conservation by means of 
controls on the balance (reinforcement and/or instruction) had learned only a 
relatively arbitrary empirical law" (Smedslund, 1961b, pp. 86-87) and thus 
did not resist extinction . On the other hand, those subjects who had , previous 
to the experiment , acquired conservation as a "logical necessity" resisted 
extinction. Three extinction trials were used. 
Again, Smedslund's second experiment may be criticized on the grounds 
that natural conservers had "lived with" their "logical necessity" of conservation 
for some time , while the non - conservers had , if at all, only recently acquired 
this concept. Equating the two groups' level of mastery of conservation and 
their rea .ction performance to ext inction may be considered questionable. 
Beilin and Franklin ( 1962), investigating the variable of instruction by 
means of measuring transfer of training effects, divided twenty-seven first 
graders and thirty-three third graders into two groups, pretesting both. After 
a delay of one week , group one received instruction in area measurement while 
group two did not . One week following instruction, both groups were posttested. 
Results of their experiment revealed a general or overall improvement through 
instruction , thus contradicting Smedslund's findings. 
More specifically , Beilin and Franklin's study revealed that while third 
graders did not show significant improvement in length measurement, perhaps 
because they had done so well in this area on the pretest, they did improve in 
areal measurements after instruction. The non-instructed third graders showed 
a loss on the posttest. First graders improved on length measurement after 
instruction but not in areal measurement . The non-instructed first graders, 
however , also improved in length measurement on the posttest, leading 
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Beilin and Franklin to conclude that pretesting itself is instructional in nature. 
This tenet has also been confi r med by Lovell and Ogilive ( 1960). Beilin and 
Franklin concluded that , contrary to Piaget ' s findings, instruction is a signifi-
cant variable to be considered in acquiring conservation concepts, but concurred 
with Piaget that in general first graders do not achieve operational area measure-
ment even with instruction. 
Mermelstein and Shulman (1967) conducted a unique investigation into 
the effects of formal education on conservation acquisition . Sixty Negro children 
ages six and nine from Prince Edwa r d County , Virginia, who due to racial con-
flicts had received no formal schooling for four years prior to the study, were 
matched with Negro children from the same state who had attended school 
regularly. After presenting both verbal and non-verbal tests of conservation, 
Mermelstein and Shulman concluded: 1. There was no difference in the grasp 
of conservation , tested verbally or non-verbally , between the two groups; 
therefore , formal education was not a significant variable to be considered 
in conservation acquisition . 2. Since significantly more children from both 
groups showed conservation acquisition on non-verbal tests than on verbal 
presentations of the same material, language was a variable to be accounted 
for in such experiments. 
In keeping with Mermelstein and Shulman's findings, Goodnow and Bethon 
(1966), working with children in Hong Kong, and Price-Williams (1962), testing 
African Bush children , found no significant difference between children. 
44 
undergoing formal training and non-formal training . Duckworth (1964) , Hood 
(1962), Hyde (1959), Lovell and Ogilvie (1961) , Peel (1960), and Wohlwill (1960) 
suggested that a variety of childhood experiences in play, home, and school, 
rather than any specific school training , facilitates conservation understanding. 
A number of investigators have studied the variable of sex in conser-
vation attainment or logical operations , With only one possible exception , 
Elkind (1961a), all agreed that sex was not a significant variable. Braine (1959), 
Case and Collison (1962), Chittenden (1964), Danziger (1957), Dodwell (1961, 
1962), Elkind ( 1961a), Laurendeau and Pinard ( 1962), and Kooistra ( 1963) 
reported no sex differences in their experiments with the child's acquisition 
of the concepts of conservation. Elkind (1961a), while generally agreeing with 
this conclusion, found that sex was significant in favor of boys when conserving 
volume. This difference he attributed to cultural influence, boys in Western 
societies being more mechanically oriented than girls. 
While Piaget does not provide his readers with information regarding 
his subject's mental age or I. Q ., several investigators (Dodwell, 1960; 
Feigenbaum, 1963; Beilin and Franklin, 1962; and Kooistra, 1963) have con-
sidered this variable. Dodwell (1960) confirmed that the subject's native 
intelligence is an important factor in number conception. Feigenbaum (1963), 
working with ninety subjects of nursery and elementary school age (four to 
seven), matched two groups having a mean I. Q . of 119 on the Stanford-Binet 
Test. In order to measure the influence of both I. Q. differences and task 
complexity in discontinuous conservation , Feigenbaum presented group one 
with the problem of placing twenty-eight beads into two glasses of different 
shapes and group two with the problem of placing only fourteen beads into 
the same glasses. Feigenbaum concluded: 1. In agreement with Piaget, 
there was a high correlation between chronological age and performance 
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on conservation tasks. 2. I. Q. was a significant factor in acquisition of con-
servation concepts . Feigenbaum stated , 
In a number of cases the performance of younger subjects 
with high I. Q. 's was also superior to that of older children 
with the lower I. Q. 's ... One might suggest that there is 
an interplay between general intelligence and possession or 
propensity for assimilation of the logical operations involved 
in the comprehension of the conservation principle. 
(Feigenbaum, 1963 , pp . 430-431) 
3 . ·While there was an indication that task. complexity "·as a factor in con-
servation acquisition, present evidence was inconclusive. 
Feigenbaum fell into the error, however, of misreading Piaget. 
Because some of Feigenbaum's (1963 , p. 429) youngest subjects did conserve , 
he stated, "These findings are not congruent with Piaget's thesis that the child 
cannot comprehend the conservation principle until the age of approximately 
65 months." While admittedly Piaget does not always delineate precisely, 
in this case he states cle arly that when designating a certain age for his 
stages of conservation , he means that 25 per cent of the subjects had conserved 
at an earlier age (Ripple and Rockcastle , 1964, p. 31). This ~a:ctor might 
easily explain Feigenbaum's apparent disjunction with Piaget's experiments. 
In Beilin and Franklin's study ( 1962) of the affects of transfer of train-
ing after practice and instruction in measurement of area, referred to previously, 
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I. Q. was not considered to be a significant variable. Beilin and Franklin 
wrote: 
If IQ has a bearing upon measurement ability it wourd 
appear to be most clearly demonstrated among first 
graders for length of measurement. Here there is a 
steady progression of mean IQs from "no measurement" 
to "operational measurement. " The Ns, however, are 
small and any generalization would be hazardous, par-
ticularly when for the other tasks and grades no clear cut 
progression exists. (Beilin and Franklin, 1962, p. 615) 
Both investigators suggested , however , that at an age when conservation is to 
be naturally acquired, I. Q. will probably play a part. 
Summary 
The present chapter, consisting of a review of the literature related 
to the studies conducted by Jean Piaget, with special emphasis upon his con-
tribution to the study of mental imagery , surveyed the historical background 
to the study of mental imagery. The contributions to the study of mental 
imagery made by Wundt, Binet, Kulpe, Woodworth, and others was presented. 
A discussion of general theory of cognition as set forth by Jean Piaget, briefly 
presenting Piaget's thought s on cognitive phylogeny, cognitive functioning, 
scientific aims, method of investigation , and stages of cognitive development, 
was presented. Piaget's five stages of cognitive development were discussed 
in some detail. Finally, Piaget's contribution to the study of mental imagery 
and the heuristic effects of Piaget's theories were presented. 
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PART III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
General Presentation of Study 
The present study, as will be indicated by the set of hypotheses to be 
tested, was designed to gather empirical information on several variables 
related to the use of mental imagery in the cognitive process of young children. 
The primary concern, however, was to locate in terms of mental age that 
point in development at which young children begin to use mental imagery 
effectively in the learning process. It was assumed that this period would be 
found in children between the ages of five and eight. The learning task used 
in this study was the acquisition of principles of conservation as conceived by 
Piaget . Other aspects of the study, such as the relation of sex, intelligence, 
and chronological age to the use of mental imagery, while of interest to the 
investigator, were subsidiary to the main goal as presented above. 
In brief , the experi me nta l design consisted of forming two matched 
groups of young children to be ins tructed in the basic principle of quantity con-
servation. One group received instruction in conservation only through the 
use of mental imagery . The control group received instruction by use of concrete 
materials as utilized by Piaget and others. The general order of events was as 
follows: 1. general selection of subjects ; 2. pretesting; 3. final selection of 
subjects for experiment ; 4. testing for I. Q . and mental age; 5. grouping for 
instruction ; 6. instruction ; 7. posttesting ; and 8. extinction testing. Each 
of these steps will be subsequently considered in detail. 
The time schedule for the experiment was as follows: Each grade 
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level, kindergarten through third , was administered a pretest and the California 
Test of Mental Maturity during the week preceding instruction. Instruction 
periods took place on a Monday, Tuesday , Wednesday, and Thursday of the 
second week. On the following Monday of the third week, each subject was 
given a posttest. On Tuesday and Wednesday after the posttest, the extinction 
test was presented. Each grade level , therefore, was involved in the experiment 
over a three week period: the first week for pretesting and grouping by I. Q. ; a 
second week during which four periods of instruction were given ; and a third 
week during which a posttest and an extinction test were administered . 
Pilot Study 
Before the present study was formally conducted, a pilot study was made 
at the Edith Bowen Laboratory School in Logan, Utah. Subjects from kindergarten, 
first, second, and third grades participated. A careful analysis was made of the 
subjects' response to variou s de monstrations of conservation problems so that 
the examiner was able to modify his pretest-posttest to include experiments 
which would be simple enough for kindergarten subjects to understand and yet 
difficult enough to measure adequately concepts of conservation on the third 
grade level. Experimentation resulted in considerable revision of some 
experiments , exclusion of others, and the addition of new items. 
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Instructional methods and materials were adjusted to be equal for both 
methods of teaching utilized in the experiment. 
Because the utilization of mental imagery in extinction procedures 
depended entirely upon the subject's accepting the judgment of the examiner, 
which in this case was contrary to truth, it was discovered that subjects reacted 
with a silent expression of mild hostility. Since this reaction more probably 
registered the subject's attitude toward adult authority than it did his understand-
ing of conservation principles, it was decided to present the extinction demonstra-
tions in concrete form only, thus eliminating the authoritarian role of the examiner. 
General Selection of Subjects 
The present study was based on a sample size of sixty-four pupils who 
were in attendance at the Ellis Elementary School in Logan, Utah, during the 
fall of 1967. Ellis Elementary School was selected and approved as the center 
for this study for two reasons. One, the population of the school was heterogenous 
in composition, representing perhaps as well as any elementary school in this 
area a cross section of the various socio-economic groups. Second, the school 
principal and the teachers expres se d an interest in the study and a willingness 
to cooperate. 
A total of sixty-four pupils was selected, sixteen each from kindergarten, 
first, second, and third grades. All pupils from the respective grade levels were 
considered in the population, and sele ction for pretesting and possible participation 
in the experiment was made by the use of a table of random numbers. For example, 
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there were two second grade classes of thirty pupils each . Both class registers 
were combined alphabetically, and each pupil was assigned a number. Selection 
then proceeded randomly. 
Twenty-six pupils, thirteen boys and thirteen girls, were randomly 
selected from each grade level for pretesting. Of these twenty-six pupils 
selected for pretesting, eight boys and eight girls were then chosen on the basis 
of having either failed all items or having passed no more than three of the 
twelve parts on the pretest. Since the design of the experiment dealt with 
instructing non-conservers in the concepts of conservation , only non-conservers 
were considered. There was, however, one exception to this policy: At the 
third grade level, where the degree of understanding of conservation appeared 
to be high, the examiner was forced to select one boy who had made a score of 
five out of twelve on the pretest. It was apparent later, however, that this subject 
belonged in the non-conserving group because of his only average resistance to 
extinction. When more than eight pupils of one sex had made scores of three or 
less on the pretest, selection was again based on a random table of numbers. 
Pretesting 
Pretesting was conducted in a teachers' workroom which was well suited 
for test administration. All doors were closed so that no outsiders could observe 
the subjects being tested. Pretesting was conducted individually and administered 
by the writer. Each subject was seated at the end of a table, size 3 feet x 7 feet, 
and the examiner was seated adjacent to the subject. Materials used in the 
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pretest were arranged in a chair next to the examiner and out of the view of the 
subject. 
There was no time limit placed on pretesting, and the examiner was 
cautious not to press any subject for rapid answers to the problems presented. 
The average time for each pretest was sixteen minutes. 
The examiner recorded in code the subject's answer to the problems 
presented and recorded any comments made by the subject. For each question 
correctly answered, the subject received one point. No points were given for 
incorrect answers . 
The nature of the pretest will be described subsequently. 
The California Test of Mental Maturity 
The California Short- Form Test of Mental Maturity ( CTMM) , devised by 
Elizabeth T . Sullivan, Willis W. Clark, and Ernest W. Tiegs, and published by 
the California Test Bureau, was ad ministered to each of the subjects selected for 
final participation in this study . The CTMM (Short- Form) was chosen as the 
intelligence test because of its national standardization at each grade level; its 
yielding of a verbal and non -verbal 1. Q. based on a synthesis of four statistically 
derived factors: logical reasoning, numerical reasoning, verbal concepts, and 
memory; its yielding of both an I. Q. and a mental age score; and its adaptation 
to group administration. 
Subjects were administered the CTMM by the writer in groups of four to 
six according to grade level. The test was administered in the teachers' workroom, 
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described above. As recommended by the publisher of the CTMM, Level 1 
Test was used for the first , second , and third grade pupils and Level O Test 
was administered to the kindergarten subjects. The administrator carefully 
followed the procedure and instructions of administrati on described by the test 
manual. 
Grouping for Instruction 
Having computed an I. Q. and a mental age score for each of the pupils in 
the experiment , subjects, by grade level, were ranked from highest I. Q. to lowest 
I. Q. Subjects were then heterogeneously placed into one of two main groups for 
instruction. For example, boy 1, with the highest I. Q. score of those tested 
for his grade level, was placed into group one, called the Concrete Instructional 
Group, to be taught by use of concrete illustration. Girl 1, again having the 
highest I. Q. among the girls tested at a particular grade level, was placed into 
group two, the Imagerial Instructional Group, to be instructed by the utilization 
of mental imagery . Next, girl 2, with the second highest I. Q. score for the girls 
of her grade level, was assigned to the Concrete Instructional Group, and boy 2 
was placed into the Imagerial Instructional Group. This crisscross pattern was 
followed so that each of the two groups contained an equal distribution of I. Q. 
rankings and sex. 
Each of the two instructional groups then contained eight subjects, four 
boys and four girls. Each group was then divided into two subgroups following a 
similar procedure: From the Concrete Instructional Group, boy 1 was placed 
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into Concrete Instructional Subgroup One, while girl 2 was assigned to Concrete 
Instructional Subgroup Two . Girl 8 was placed in Concrete Instructional Sub-
group One, while boy 7 was assigned to Concrete Instructional Subgroup Two. 
This pattern was continued so that each of the two Concrete Instructional Groups 
contained a balanced representation of sex and I. Q. scores assigned for that 
particular method of instruction . The same procedure was then applied to the 
Imagerial Instructional Group . The end result of this procedure was the formation 
of two balanced subgroups at each grade level for both methods of instruction. It 
was felt that small groups each composed of four members could best be handled 
by the experimenter and would provide maximum learning opportunities resulting 
from small gToup interaction. 
Instructional Periods 
As explained before, instruction took place on Monday, Tuesday, Wednes-
day, and Thursday of the second week of each grade's involvement in the experi-
ment. Subjects were seated at the table, across from the instructor. Instructional 
groups were stable so that each subject participated in the same instructional 
group, scheduled for a set period each day. 
Two methods of standardizing instructional periods were considered by 
the experimenter. One , instruction could be limited to a set time period, thus 
insuring that all groups received equal instruction periods in terms of time. The 
chief weakness of this method of standardization was that some groups might 
complete the conservation experiments before the allotted time had expired, while 
others might not be able to cover the scheduled experiments during the set periods. 
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Two, instruction periods could be standardized by covering a set number of 
conservation experiments each session. In this way, each group would be 
exposed to identical material or concepts. The second of the two alternatives 
was chosen. Each instructional period, therefore, was planned in advance of 
the experiment to cover a set number of experiences in conservation. These 
experiments will be described in detail later. 
It is interesting to note that various groups required differing amounts 
of time to cover the same experiments. In general, the Concrete Instructional 
Groups required a longer period of instructional time to cover the experiments 
than did the Imagerial Instructional Groups. This is explained by the time re-
quired for distribution , manipulation, and collection of materials used by the 
Concrete Instructional Groups. It takes more time to alter physically a clay 
ball into a sausage than it does to "imagine" such a reshaping to take place. 
Once the Imagerial Instruction Group grasped the task at hand, they were able 
to proceed from one experiment to the next without delay. The Concrete In-
structional Groups, therefore, received about four minutes more of instructional 
time each period than did the Imagerial Instructional Groups. The average 
instructional period for all groups was approximately eighteen minutes for each 
period. 
Posttesting 
The posttest, administered individually on the first day of the third 
week of participation in the experiment, was identical with the pretest. The average 
time for posttest administration was fifteen minutes. This was one minute less than 
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the average time for the pr e test , the reduction being explained on the basis 
that less time was required to acclimate the subjects to the testing situation. 
Because the subjects were now accustomed to the examiner, they were relaxed 
and responsive . 
Scoring on both the pretest and posttest was done in code so that the 
subjects were unable to receive any reinforcement from a correct or incorrect 
response as recorded by the examiner. 
Extinction Testing 
Based on Clark Hull's (Hilgard and Bower, 1966) principle of the 
resistance to extinct ion as a measur e of learning and following Smedslund's 
( 1931b) use of extinction in the replication of Piaget's conservation experi-
ments, six extinction problems were presented to each subject. Again, each 
subject was tested individually in the teachers' workroom. 
As in Smedslund's (1961 b) extinction procedures, the examiner 
surreptitiously manipulated the materials involved so as to indicate that the 
substances undergoing tr ansformations were not invariant. For example, two 
balls of clay were represented to the subject as being equal, when in fact one 
contained more clay than the other . When placed on a balance the ball contain-
ing more clay was easily detected . 
While the nature of the extinction problems will be delineated later, 
the scoring of this test will be explained now. Six problems involving conser-
vation of volume and length were presented. Problem number one was awarded 
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a score of one point if corr ec tl y ans wered. Problem number two was given a 
score of two points , problem number three, three points, and so on through 
problem number six which recei ved a score of six points for a correct answer. 
Thus , for a correct response to all six extinction problems, a subject received 
a total score of twenty-one points. For each question, a score of zero was 
given for an incorrect response. 
The examiner also attempted to apply a judgmental evaluation to each 
response. For example , an incorrect answer was awarded a score of one point . 
A correct answer given with slight hesitation and followed, when proven wrong, 
with no argumentation or resistance to extinction, was awarded two points. A 
correct answer followed with no hesitation and no argumentation was awarded 
three points. A correct answer with no hesitation and only mild resistance to 
extinction was given four points , and a correct answer followed with strong 
resistance was awarded five points . It become apparent, however, that such a 
procedure was too subjecti ve in nature to be valid. In many cases subjects who 
were timid might not verbalize their feelings of resistance to extinction, thus 
lowering their score. For this reason the judgmental scores were not con-
sidered in the analysis of the data. 
Extinction tests were administered on the fifth and sixth days after the 
final period of instruction . Therefore, it would be anticipated that a certain 
amount of extinction or forgetting would have taken place in the four days during 
which no reinforcement was given for the principles of conservation learned. 
The rationale for administering extinction tests on two different days 
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rather than on any one day was as follows. Since there were sixteen subjects 
at each grade level to receive the extinction test, it was feared that the period 
of time required for the administration of the test might be greater than the 
time available during the school day at certain grade levels. Therefore, to 
insure that both methods of instruction received equal treatment on extinction 
procedures, it was decided to select from each of the two main groups, repre-
senting the two methods of instruction, four subjects for the extinction test on 
Tuesday and four for the extinction test on Wednesday. By this method of 
balanced selection, both methods of instruction received equal treatment. 
A Description of Instruments 
The pretest and posttest 
The same instrument was used for both pretesting and posttesting. 
This instrument consisted of twelve brief demonstrations followed by a question 
to measure the subject's grasp of the principle of conservation. Of the twelve 
questions on the pre-posttest, six questions utilized concrete materials, such 
as clay, water, etc . in the demonstration, and six questions relied only upon 
the use of the subject's mental imagery to visualize the transformation of 
materials. The six concretely illustrated questions corresponded to the six 
imagerial questions. In other words, each demonstration or question was 
presented two times to each subject, once concretely and once imagerially. 
In no case did the corresponding concrete and imagerial question directly 
follow each other. The two groups of questions were arranged so that question 
one was presented concretely, to be repeated by use of imagery as question 
seven; question two was presented imagerially, to be repeated concretely 
as question eight, and so on. 
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The subject's response to each question was recorded in code, along 
with comments regarding his reactions, hesitancy in answering, etc. 
The presentation of each of the twelve problems or questions was care-
fully prepared and remained stable for each subject in the experiment. A 
description of the twelve pretest-posttest problems follows: 
1. Problem number one, presented concretely, was duplicated 
imagerially as problem number seven. The subject was shown four pokerchips, 
one blue in color, two white, and one red, and was told that these represented 
play money. As the blue chip was placed on the table before the subject, the 
examiner said, "You can take the blue money to the store and buy some candy 
with it. " While placing the white chip beside the blue one, the examiner 
continued, "Now, if you take the white play money to the store, you can buy the 
same amount of candy . " Next, the second white chip was placed beside the 
blue chip and, as the examiner placed the red chip beside the second white 
one, he said, "If you take this white money to the store, you can buy the same 
amount of candy that you can buy with this red one. The white money and the 
red money also buy the same amount of candy. Which play money can buy 
more candy for you, the blue one or the red one ? " 
When this question was presented as number seven in imagerial form, 
thP examiner said to the subject , "I want you to imagine some play money on the 
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table." Then, using his finger to outline the chips, the examiner described the 
play money : "Here is a blue piece of money; next to it is a white piece. Here 
is another white piece of play money , and here is a red piece. Do you see them? 
Let me point them out to you again. Here is a piece of blue play money, a 
white one, another white one, and a red one." Then, pointing to each piece 
of imaginary money , the examiner repeated the demonstration as presented in 
its concrete form . 
2. Problem number two was presented in image rial form and repeated 
in concrete form as question number eight. Since question number two was the 
first of the demonstrations involving the use of mental imagery, the examiner 
asked the male subject, "Do you ever use your imagination when you are playing 
games? Do you play like you have a gun in your hand when really you don't?" 
Or, to the female subjects: "Do you play like you are rocking a baby doll in 
your arms when you really don't have one there at all?" 
After the subject answered, the examiner said, "Well, let's use our 
imagination now . Imagine a long piece of paper on the table . " Indicating a width 
of about three inches with his fingers , the examiner continued, "Let the paper 
start here and go down the table to this point. " The examiner slowly moved his 
spread fingers down the table to indicate a strip of paper about · thirty inches in 
length. "Do you see the paper? Put your finger on the end of the paper so that 
it won't blow away . This piece of paper is yours. Now, I am going to put 
another piece of paper on the table beside your paper. Watch. " The examiner 
demonstrated as he laid out an equal length of imaginary paper. "The first 
piece of paper is yours; the other piece is mine. Your paper and my paper 
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are just alike. Both pieces of paper have the same amount of paper in them. 
I am going to take my paper and cut it into several small pieces with scissors." 
The examiner went through the motions of cutting his paper into five pieces. 
"Now, I am going to lay my pieces beside your paper, except I will begin at 
this point. " Laying the first piece of imaginary paper about six inches in front 
of the subject's finger, which marked the starting point of his paper, the 
examiner continued. "Then I will skip some space and lay out my next piece; 
skip some space and put the next piece down; skip some more space and lay 
the next one down; skip some more space and put the last piece down ." As the 
examiner said the above, he marked out with his spread fingers the pieces of 
paper and the spaces skipped. 
All of the cut pieces were now arranged beside the subject's imaginary 
paper so that they extend beyond his paper at both ends. The examiner, pointing 
to the beginning and the end of his imaginary paper, next said, "My pieces begin 
here and run to this point with spaces skipped between each piece of paper. Your 
paper starts here," pointing to the subject's finger, "and goes to this point, but 
it does not have spaces because it was not cut. Where is there now more paper, 
in your piece of paper or in my pieces of paper?" 
When this demonstration was presented concretely as question number 
eight, two equal strips of paper, three inches wide by thirty inches long, were 
placed on the table before the subject. The examiner, without making the 
introductory remarks about imaginary games, then completed the procedure 
as explained above. 
3. Probl e m numb er three, presented concretely, was repeated as 
problem number nine through the use of mental imagery . The examiner 
placed one-hundred fifty beans in a pile on the table before the subject. The 
examiner asked the subject , "How many beans would you guess are in this 
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pile, one-hundred or two-hundred?" The subjects made a guess , and the examiner 
said, "That's a good guess . Now, if there are 100 (or 200) beans in this pile , 
here is another pile of beans just like it. " The examiner placed an equal 
number of beans in a second pile on the table. "If there are 100 (or 200) beans 
in the first pile, and the second pile is just like the first one, the second pile 
also has 100 (or 200) beans in it. Both piles have 100 (or 200) beans in them. 
They are both just alike . " Placing a small glass be side one of the piles of beans , 
the examiner continued , "Le t 's put the beans in this pile into this glass. " Both 
the subject and the examiner deposited all the beans from one pile into the 
glass . "Where are there more beans now, in the glass or in the pile?" 
4 . Problem four was presented concretely and repeated imagerially as 
problem number ten . The subject was shown three glasses. Glass A was 3 1/2 
inches tall, tapering to 3 inches in diameter at the top, and held 8 1/4 ounces of 
liquid. Glasses B1 and B2 were identical, each being 2 1/2 inches tall , 2 inches 
in diameter and holding 3 1/ 4 ounces of liquid. The examiner then showed the 
subject a fourth glass , Glass C , which was different in size and shape from 
the other three glasses . Glass C was 3 1/2 inches tall, tapering to 2 inches at 
the top, and would contain 3 ounces of liquid. From a pitcher of water the exami~ 
ner filled Glass C and said to the subject, "Let's fill my glass with water and 
pour it into this large glass. Now, we will fill my glass again and empty it 
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again into the large glass. There are now two of my glasses full of water in 
the large glass , aren't there? " The examiner waited for the subject to respond . 
"Now let's fill my glass again and empty it into one of the smaller glasses. We 
will do the same thing again and put the same amount of water into the other 
small glass. There is one glass of water in each of the two small glasses, isn't 
there?" Again , time was given for the subject's response. "Where is there 
now more water, in the two small glasses put together or in the one large 
glass by its elf?" 
5. Problem number five was presented imagerially and repeated 
concretely as problem number eleven. The examiner said to the subject, "Let's 
use our imagination again. This time I am going to put some beans in two rows 
on the table. The first r ow of be ans will be yours, so count them out loud as I 
put each bean down." As the examiner placed each imaginery bean before the 
subject, the subject counted aloud , "One, two, three ... ten." The examiner 
then stated, "There are ten beans in your row. Now I am going to put ten beans 
in a row for me : One , two , thre e . .. ten . Your row and my row are just 
alike. They both have ten beans in them. I am going to pick up your beans 
and put them down like this . " The ex aminer picked up the subject's imaginary 
beans and spread them out in a row twice as long as the first one . The examiner 
counted the beans as he replaced them in the new row so that the subject would 
know that all ten beans were again being used. Pointing to the beginning and 
end of each row of imaginary beans , the examiner said, "Your row of beans 
now begins here and ends at this point , while my row of beans still begins here 
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and ends here . Where are ther e now more beans, in your row or in my row?" 
6. Problem number six, presented imagerially, was repeated con-
cretely as problem number twelve. The subject was asked to imagine a very 
tall glass . The examiner indicated the height of the glass by holding his hand 
about 10 inches above the top of the table. He stated, "This glass is very tall 
but very thin. It is about this big around . " The examiner formed a small 
circle about one inch in diameter with his thumb and forefinger. "The glass is 
tall and skinny, like a tube. Next to it is a short glass only this high," again 
using his hand to indicate a glass that was only about four inches tall. Indi -
eating with his fingers a diameter of about four inches, the examiner said, 
"But the short glass is this big around. We have a short , fat glass and a tall, 
skinny glass . Now , I am going to take a "play glass" in my hand and fill it all 
the way to the top with water from this imaginary or play pitcher. Watch care-
fully . " The examiner went through the motions of filling the imaginary glass 
in his hand with water and , while acting out his words, said , "I will pour my 
glass that is full of water into the tall, thin glass . As I pour the water in, the 
water comes all the way up to the top of the thin glass." The examiner indicated 
with his finger the upward flow of the water line. "Next, I will fill the glass in 
my hand with the same amount of water again and pour all of it into the short , 
fat glass . The water comes up to the top of the short glass . We have a short, 
fat glass full of water and a ,tall , thin glass full of water. Where is there now 
more water, in the short , fat glass or in the tall, thin glass?" 
Extinction Test 
As indicated previously, the purpose of the extinction test was to 
demonstrate the level of conservation acquisition gained during the four 
periods of instruction. It was assumed that subjects who had merely learned 
to respond with the correct answer, but had not grasped the invariance of 
transformations as a "logical necessity, n would more quickly succumb to 
extinction. 
Extinction procedures were conducted in the teachers' workroom, 
described previously. 
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The extinction test consisted of six demonstrations presented through 
the use of concrete materials. During the pilot study, as indicated previously , 
it was discovered that when imagerial extinction questions were presented, the 
examiner was placed in the position of disagreeing with the subject on a personal 
level, thus arousing resentment. Also, by denying the accuracy of the subject's 
correct response to a problem presented imagerially, the examiner became 
an authoritative figure. Under this condition, the extinction procedure more 
probably measured the subject's willingness either to conform to or resist 
authority than it did his understanding of the nature of conservation. Therefore, 
only concrete materials which could be objectively evaluated by both the subject 
and the examiner were used. 
Before the presentation of the first problem, the subject was introduced 
to the functioning of a balance or scale through the use of coins as demonstration 
weights . When the examiner was satisfied that the subject clearly understood 
the workings of the balance, he presented the first extinction demonstration. 
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A description of each extinction problem follows: 
1. The subject was shown two balls of blue clay and told that each was 
equal in content and weight. This was verified on the balance scale. In reality, 
however, one of the two balls contained slightly more clay than its mate. This 
inequality of substance was not noted on the balance because, unknown to the 
subject, the examiner held the release lock on the balance closed so that even 
significantly disproportionate weights would have appeared equal. 
Once the subject was satisfied that both balls of clay contained equal 
amounts of substance, the heavier ball was distorted into a pancake. The 
examiner then asked the subject, "Where is there more clay now?" If the 
correct answer was given, the examiner asked, "But which one looks larger?" 
The subjects, viewing the larger diameter of the pancake, replied that it 
looked larger but in fact was not. "Well," the examiner then said, "usually, 
things that look bigger, are bigger. Let's put the ball and the pancake on the 
balance and check. " This being done, with the balance lock released, the 
pancake was demonstrated to contain more clay. The examiner then commented, 
as in passing, "You see, things that look bigger, sometimes are bigger!" 
In cases where the subject's first reply was incorrect, indicating an 
inadequate grasp of conservation, no response or reinforcement was given by 
the examiner. In such cases the materials were not checked on the balance 
to see if the subject's answer was correct or incorrect. 
2. Three glasses were placed before the subject. Glass A was three 
times as large as Glass B1 and Glass B2 , both of which were identical. A 
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fourth glass, Glass C, was held in the examiner's hand and filled with water 
from a pitcher on the table. Glass C was emptied into Glass A. This was 
repeated a second time and so indicated verbally to the subject. Refilling 
Glass C, the examiner emptied its contents into Glass B1; this was repeated, 
emptying the contents into Glass B2. The examiner then said, "I have put two 
of my glasses full of water into the large glass and one glass of water into each 
of the two small ones. Where is there more water now, in the one large glass 
or in the two small glasses put together?" 
If the subject responded with an incorrect answer, no comment was 
made by the examiner. If, as was most frequently the case, the correct answer 
was given, the examiner said, "Well, bigger glasses sometimes hold more water 
than little ones. Let's check." Placing before the subject a new glass, identical 
to Glass A, the examiner said, "Let's empty the two smaller glasses into the 
new glass that is just like the big one. If the two smaller glasses have the same 
amount of water in them as the big one does, the water levels will be the same 
in both big glasses. " 
Unknown to the subject, the examiner had poured from the pitcher into 
his glass, Glass C, less water before emptying it into Glasses B1 and B2 than 
he had before emptying it into Glass A. Therefore, Glass A actually contained 
more water than did B 1 and B2 combined. Once B1 and B2 were emptied into 
the new glass, this was obvious. 
The examiner then asked, "Which of the two big glasses has more water 
in it?" The answer was self-evident. "You see, " said the examiner, "sometimes 
bigger glasses hold more water than little glasses!" 
3. Two equal pieces of red string, sixteen inches in length, were 
placed on the table before the subject. Inspection was made to verify that 
both strings were identical. The examiner, explaining his actions, cut one 
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of the strings into five smaller pieces. Unknown to the subject, the examiner 
added another short section of string to the cut pieces. The cut pieces were 
then spread out , with spaces between them, beside the uncut string so that 
they covered a distance of about twenty-four inches. 
"Which row now has more string in it?" the examiner asked. If the 
subject stated that both rows still contained equal amounts of string, as in fact 
they should have , the examiner then asked, "Which row looks longer?" After 
the subject had responded that the cut row looked longer, the examiner said, 
"Sometimes things that look longer are longer. Let's put the pieces back 
together, just as if they had not been cut, and see which row has more string." 
Once this was done, the examiner asked, "Now, which row really has more 
string in it?" The subject, unless they chose to debate the question, responded 
that the cut pieces contained more string. 
4. Two apparently equal balls of green clay were placed before the 
subject. The same procedure as used in extinction problem number one was 
repeated, except that on this occasion the ball containing more clay was trans-
formed into a "long snake." 
5. Two strips of green crepe paper, size one inch by twenty-four 
inches, were placed before the subject, who verified that the strips of paper 
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were equal in width and length . The examiner said, "Let's cut one strip of 
paper into several small pieces and lay them out like this. " Cutting the crepe 
paper into six pieces, the examiner proceeded to place the paper beside the uncut 
piece so that, with spaces between each piece, the new row extended beyond the 
uncut one at both ends. Unknown to the subject, the examiner had slightly 
stretched several of the cut pieces of crepe paper before spreading them out. 
"Where is there more paper now, in the cut row or the uncut row?" 
asked the examiner. If the subject indicated that the two rows still contained 
equal amounts of paper , the examiner asked, "Which row looks longer?" The 
subject responded that the row of cut pieces looked longer. "Well, sometimes 
things that look longer are longer," stated the examiner. "Let's put the cut 
pi eces back together and see?" This being done, it was evident to the subject 
that the cut row contained mor e paper . "Where was there really more paper?" 
the examiner asked, then pausing for the subject's reply. 
As in each of the extinction problems, if the subject gave an incorrect 
answer to the main conservation question, no reinforcement or comment was 
made . 
6. Twenty beans were placed on the table before the subject. From the 
pile of twenty beans the examiner formed two rows, one for the subject and one 
for himself, each containing ten beans spaced over a distance of twelve inches. 
The subject counted the beans as the examiner formed each row and thus con-
firmed that both rows were equal. The examiner said, "I am going to pick 
up your row of beans and spread them out like this. " The examiner picked up 
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the subject's row, inserting without his knowledge two additional beans. A new 
row, spanning a distance of twenty-four inches was quickly formed. "Which 
row has more beans in it now, your row or my row? 11 asked the examiner. If 
an answer indicating conservation were given, the examiner said, "Your row 
looks like it has more beans in it . Sometimes things that look like they have 
more, do have more. Count the beans in your row and see how many there are. 11 
This being done, the subject counted twelve beans instead of ten. 
A Description of Instructional Materials 
During each of the four periods of instruction, subjects were seated at 
a large table in the teachers' workroom. The instructor was seated at the table 
across from the subjects . On each of the four days, ten experiments in con-
servation were presented and discussed. The instructor sought to involve 
subject participation in the experiments as much as possible. Subjects were 
repeatedly asked to explain and defend their responses to the conservation 
problems at hand. 
The experiments for each day were identical for both the Concrete 
Instructional Group and the Imagerial Instructional Group, the only difference 
being that one group received concrete materials to manipulate and observe 
and the other group used mental imagery to visualize such materials. 
It should be noted that while in a few cases the experiments conducted 
during instructional periods were similar to those employed on the pretest and 
posttest, they were never identical. For example, while the pretest and posttest 
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utilized variousl y shap ed glasses filled with water to measure the subject's 
grasp of conservation concepts , during instruction periods, glasses were filled 
with rice . Also , the glasses used on these two occasions were radically differ-
ent in size and shape . The posttest, therefore, measured the transfer of train-
ing received during instructional periods. 
An outline of the ten experiments presented for each day follows: 
First day 
1. Two larg e balls of blue clay were presented to the subjects. The 
instructor transformed one ball of clay into a pancake. Question asked: Where 
is there now more clay? 
2 . Each subject was gi ven two equal balls of yellow clay . Instruction 
was given to alter the shape of one of the balls into a pancake. Question asked: 
Where is there now more cla y ? 
3. Using the materials distributed in experiment number two, each 
subject was instructed to distort one of the balls into a "long string." Question 
asked: Where is there now more clay? 
4. Two large but equal balls of blue clay were presented. The 
instructor divided one of the balls into two smaller units. Question asked: 
Where is there now more clay , in the one large ball or in the two smaller balls 
put together? 
5. Experiment number five was the same as number four, except 
that one of the balls of clay was now divided into three smaller balls. Question 
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asked: Where is there now more clay, in the large ball or in the three smaller 
balls put together? 
6. Two equal lengths of red string, fifteen inches long, were presented 
to the subjects. The instructor rolled one length of string into a small ball. 
Question asked: Where is there now more string? 
7. Using the string presented in experiment number six, the instructor 
arranged one length into a circle and one length into a straight line. Question 
asked: Which piece of string now has more string in it? 
8. Each subject was given two equal lengths of red string, fifteen 
inches long. After establishing that the strings were of equal length, the 
instructor cut one string into several pieces for each subject. The cut pieces 
were placed parallel to the uncut piece, but arranged with spaces between each 
piece so that the cut row was longer in appearance than the uncut string. 
Question asked: Which row has more string now? 
9. For experiment number nine the same materials used in experiment 
number eight were employed. The cut pieces of string were arranged side by 
side or parallel to each other. In this arrangement the uncut string extended 
beyond the parallel arrangement of cut pieces. Question asked: Where is there 
now more string, in the cut pieces or in the uncut piece? 
10. Materials from experiment number eight were again used. In the 
present experiment, however, all but one of the cut pieces were arranged 
parallel and adjacent to each other; one cut piece was rolled into a tight knot 
or ball. The cut pieces and the knot were placed beside the uncut , straight 
72 
string. Question asked: Where is there more string now, in the uncut string 
or in the cut pieces and the knot all put together? 
Second day 
Before the experiments were begun, each subject was asked to express 
in his own words what he had learned from the previous period of instruction. 
1. The instructor presented to the subjects two stacks of twelve checkers, 
one black and one red. The red stack was then arranged into four smaller stacks. 
Question asked: Are there now more red checkers or black checkers? 
2. Each subject was given a stack of four black and four red checkers. 
After confirming that the stacks were equal in height and number, the subjects 
were instructed to retain the one stack of black checkers and to form two stacks 
of red checkers. Question asked: Where are there now more checkers, in the 
black stack or in the two red stacks put together? 
3. The checkers used in experiment number two were again restacked 
by color. Subjects were then instructed to spread out the four black checkers 
so that no black checker stood upon another. Question asked: Are there now 
more black checkers or red checkers? 
4 . The instructor presented to the subjects two blank sheets of typing 
paper, the equality of which was confirmed by the group. One sheet was then 
cut into four equal parts, and the parts were arranged so as to form a large 
square, covering a diameter of two feet. Question asked: Where is there now 
more paper, in the uncut sheet or in the cut sheet? 
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5. E ach subject was given two sheets of typing paper. The instructor 
then cut one of each subject's two sheets into four equal pieces. The subjects 
were instructed to spread out the cut sections into a straight but long row. 
Question asked: Where is there now more paper, in the uncut sheet or in the 
four smaller pieces put together? 
6. Using the uncut sheet and the four equal sections of paper obtained 
in experiment number five , each subject was instructed to stack his four pieces 
of paper one on top of the other . Question asked: Where is there now more 
paper, in the uncut sheet or in the stack of pieces? 
7. The instructor presented to the subjects five boxes of differing 
sizes. The first box was of shoe box size , and the other four boxes were each 
progressively smaller so that the last box was 1 x 2 x 2 inches . The five boxes 
were arranged on the table in order of size. Next, the instructor produced 
another set of five boxes identical to the first and formed a new row parallel 
to the first , matching box with box according to size so that the subjects could 
confirm the equality of the boxes in the two rows . From one of the rows, the 
instructor then placed the smallest box into the next largest and continued this 
process of inserting the smaller box into the larger until all of the boxes in that 
row were contained in the shoe box. Question asked: Where are there more 
boxes now, in the one shoe box or in the long row of boxes ? 
8. Using the two sets of boxes described in the above experiment, the 
instructor stacked one set so as to form a pyramid while the other set of boxes 
remained in a row . Question asked: Where are there more boxes now? 
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9. The subjects were shown one small glass and a bowl containing rice. 
The instructor filled the glass with rice and poured its contents into a small pile 
on the table. The glass was refilled and again emptied onto the same pile, so 
that the pile then contained two glasses of rice. The glass was again filled and 
emptied into a new pile, pile number two. Again the glass was filled and pile 
number three was formed. Question asked: Where is there now more rice, in 
pile number one or piles number two and three put together? 
10. Using the materials described in experiment number nine, the 
instructor emptied one glass of rice into a well formed pile. A second glass of 
rice was spread out on the table so as to cover an area of about two square feet. 
Question asked: Where is there now more rice ? 
Third day 
Again, before the demonstrations began, subjects were asked to relate 
to the instructor what they had learned on the preceeding day. 
1. Two identical rubber bands were shown to the subjects. One rubber 
band was then stretched to be several times as long as the other. Question 
asked: Which rubber band now contains more rubber? 
2. Two identical boxes, size 1 x 2 x 2 inches, were presented to the 
subjects, who were told that each box contained the same number of pennies. 
The pennies in one box were then emptied and spread out onto the table. 
Question asked: Where are there now more pennies, in the box or on the table? 
3. The instructor arranged before the subjects four toothpicks so as to 
form a square. Two additional toothpicks were then crossed inside the square. 
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Subjects were asked to count the toothpicks in the design. Next, the design was 
duplicated, the subjects again counting the toothpicks. The toothpicks from one 
of the designs were then arranged into a long, straight line. Question asked: 
Where are there now more toothpicks, in the box design or in the straight line? 
4. Two piles of toothpicks were formed on the table, and the subjects 
were told that each pile contained twenty toothpicks. One pile was then bound 
into a small bundle held together by a rubber band. Question asked: Where 
are there now more toothpicks ? 
5. Each subject was given two identical sheets of typing paper. Subjects 
were instructed to fold one sheet of paper in half. Question asked: Which sheet 
now has more paper in it, the folded sheet or the unfolded one? 
6. Using the two sheets of paper described in demonstration number 
five, subjects were instructed to fold the folded sheet again, so that it now 
appeared to be one-fourth as large as the unfolded sheet. Question asked: 
Where is there now more paper? 
7. Subjects were again instructed to refold the folded sheet, so that it 
now appeared to be one-eighth as large as the unfolded one. Question asked: 
Where is there now more paper? 
8. Each subject was given three glasses. Glass A was three inches 
tall and one inch in diameter; Glass B, two inches tall and three-fourths of an 
inch in diameter; and Glass C, one inch tall and three-fourths of an inch in 
diameter. From a central container filled with rice, each subject filled Glass 
C and emptied its contents into Glass A. Glass C was then refilled and emptied 
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into Glass B. It was noted that the level of rice was different for Glass A and 
Glass B. Question asked: Where is there now more rice, in Glass A or Glass 
B? 
9. Each subject was given one small glass. Each subject was instructed 
to fill his glass with rice from a central container on the table and to empty the 
rice into a pile before him. Subjects were then told to refill their glass with rice 
and place the glass beside the pile. Question asked: Where is there now more 
rice, in the pile or in the glass ? 
10. The instructor placed before the subjects one small glass and the 
container of rice. The glass was then filled with rice two times and emptied 
into one pile. Next , the glass was again filled twice and emptied into two 
smaller piles. It was pointed out to the subjects that the large pile contained 
two glasses of rice and each of the two smaller piles contained one glass of 
rice. Question asked: Where is there now more rice, in the large pile or in 
the two smaller piles put together? 
Fourth day 
Before presenting the demonstrations, which were basically a review 
of those previously done, each subject was again quizzed regarding what he 
had learned during other instructional periods. 
1. Subjects were shown two equal balls of clay. One ball was then 
distorted into a pancake. Question asked: Where is there now more clay? 
2. Two identical strings , fifteen inches long, were laid out before the 
subjects. One string was then rolled into a small ball or knot. Question asked: 
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Where is there now more string? 
3. One of the two identical strings, used in the previous experiment, 
was cut into three pieces. The three sections were then spread out so that 
they were obviously longer in appearance than the uncut string. Question 
asked: Where is there now more string? 
4. Two stacks of twelve checkers, one red one and one black were 
presented to the subjects. The red stack of checkers was then divided into 
three equal stacks. Question asked: Are there now more red or black 
checkers? 
5. Two identical sheets of typing paper were placed before the subjects. 
One sheet was then cut into four equal sections and spread out to cover an a,rea 
two feet square. Question asked: Where is there now more paper? 
6. Subjects were shown a small glass and a container full of rice. The 
glass was then filled with rice two times, the contents of which were poured 
into one pile. Filling the glass with rice two more times, the instructor made 
two smaller piles. Question asked: Where is there now more rice, in the one 
large pile or in the two smaller piles put together? 
7. Subjects were shown three glasses and the container of rice. Glass 
A was tall and thin; Glass B and Glass C were shorter than Glass A. Glass C 
was then filled with rice and emptied into Glass A. Glass C was again filled 
and emptied into Glass B. Question asked: Where is there now more rice, in 
Glass A or in Glass B? 
8. Two boxes containing an equal number of pennies were presented . 
One box of pennies was then emptied onto the table. Question asked: Where 
are there now more pennies, in the box or on the table? 
9. Ten toothpicks were arranged into two parallel rows, each con-
taining five toothpicks. One r ow was then rearranged to be much longer than 
the other. Question asked: Where are there now more toothpicks? 
Statement of Hypotheses 
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1. It was hypothesized that some children from each grade level would 
grasp the principles of conservation when taught through the use of concrete 
· example and anticipator y imagery . 
2. It was further hypothesi zed that subjects would learn to conserve 
more quickly and thoroughl y thr ough the use of concrete example than through 
the use of anticipatory image r y. 
3. It was also hypothesized that the mental age of subjects would be a 
significant factor or va r iable in determining the gradient of learning through 
mental imagery . In other words, the more advanced the child's mental age, 
the more adroit he would be in using his mental imagery as a medium of 
learning. 
4 . It was hypothesized that between the ages of five and eight a general 
trend or point in the maturation process would be detected at which anticipatory 
imagery can be effectively utilized in the learning of conservation. 
5. It was hypothesized that extinction would be faster and more complete 
on the subjects having been instructed through anticipatory imagery than on 
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subjects undergoing concrete instruction , mental imagery being a more abstract 
method of learning and thus requiring more highly developed mental structures. 
Summary 
The purpose of the present chapter was to set forth the research design 
used in this experiment. First was presented a general survey of the experi -
mental procedures including a description of the pilot study and the method of 
subject selection and grouping . . Brief comments concerning the method and 
procedures of pretesting , the administration of the California Test of Mental 
Maturity , posttesting , and extinction testing were presented. The rationale 
for the above tests was discussed. 
There followed a detailed description of the pretest and posttest and 
the test of extinction. A detailed description of the materials and methods of 
instruction for both treatment groups was presented and discussed. The chapter 
concluded by presenting a statement of the five hypotheses which the present 
experiment was designed to test. 
PART IV 
RESULTS 
The present section of this dissertation is limited to a presentation 
of statistical results as they apply to the five hypotheses set forth in Part III. 
For a more exhaustive review of the statistical data available for the present 
experiment, the reader is referred to the Appendices. 
All data was submitted to the high speed computers of the Utah State 
University Computer Center . The computers calculated means and standard 
deviations, correlations , and analyses of variance between the thirteen 
major variables considered in the experiment. 
Results: Hypothesis I 
It was hypothesized that some children from each grade level would 
grasp the principles of conservation when taught through the use of concrete 
example and anticipatory imagery. A study of Tables 1, 2, and 3 confirms 
that this hypothesis was correct. 
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Table 1, which compares the pretest and posttest scores for subjects 
having undergone the teaching of the principles of conservation by concrete 
methods, shows that there was a marked improvement on the posttest at all 
grade levels. The over-all mean increase for the combined grades was 9. 91, 
or, expressed differently, total posttest scores were 4072 per cent of the 
Table 1. A comparison of scores on pretest-posttest for subjects under concrete methoda 
Pretest Posttest Difference in pretest-posttest 
Grade and sex Imagery Concrete Total Imagery Concrete Total Imagery Concrete Total 
All grades combined . 09 . 16 . 25 5. 06 5.12 10 . 18 4 . 97 4.97 9 . 91 
Kindergarten . 00 . 00 . 00 4.62 4.75 9.37 4.62 4.75 9 . 37 
First grade . 25 . 12 . 37 5.25 5.37 10.62 5.00 5. 25 10 . 12 
Second grade . 00 .25 . 25 4.50 4.50 9.00 4 . 50 4.25 8.75 
Third grade . 12 .25 . 37 5.87 5.87 11. 75 5.75 5 . 62 11. 37 
Both sexes combined . 09 . 16 .25 5. 06 5.12 10. 18 4.97 4.97 9.91 
Boys . 12 . 06 . 19 5.12 5.12 10. 25 5.00 5 . 06 10.06 
Girls . 06 .25 . 31 5.00 5.12 10.12 4.94 4.87 9. 75 
Kindergarten boys . 00 . 00 . 00 5.25 5.25 10.50 5.25 5. 25 10.50 
Kindergarten girls .00 . 00 .00 4.00 4.25 8.25 4.00 4.25 8.25 
First grade boys . 50 .25 . 75 5. 00 5.00 10.00 4.50 4.75 9.25 
First grade girls . 00 . 00 . 00 5.50 5.75 11. 25 5.50 5.75 11. 00 
Second grade boys . 00 . 00 .00 4.50 4.50 9.00 4.50 4.50 9.00 
Second grade girls .00 . 50 . 50 4.50 4.50 9.00 4.50 4.00 8.50 
Third grade boys . 00 . 00 . 00 5.75 5.75 11. 50 5.75 5.75 11. 50 
Third grade girls .25 . 50 .75 6.00 6.00 12.00 5.75 5.50 11. 25 
aStatistics indicate the average number of correct responses for each group. 00 
...... 
a Table 2. A comparison of scores on pretest-posttest for subjects under anticipatory imagery method 
Pretest Posttest Difference in 2retest-2osttest 
Grade and sex Imagery Concrete Total Imagery Concrete Total Imagery Concrete Total 
All grades combined . 25 . 31 . 56 5.28 5.16 10. 44 5.03 4.84 9.87 
Kindergarten . 00 . 00 . 00 5.12 4 . 87 10. 00 5.12 4 .8 7 10. 00 
First grade . 50 . 50 1. 00 5.50 5.25 10.75 5.00 4.75 9,75 
Sec ond grade . 00 . 12 .12 4.62 4.62 9.25 4.62 4.5 0 9. 12 
Third grade . 50 . 62 1. 12 5.87 5.87 11. 75 5.37 5.25 10.62 
Both sexes combined .25 . 31 . 56 5.28 5.16 10.44 5.03 4 .8 4 9. 87 
Boys . 25 . 37 . 62 4.94 4.75 9.69 4.69 4.37 9.06 
Girl s . 25 .25 . 50 5.62 5.56 11. 19 5.37 5.31 10.69 
Kindergarten boys . 00 . 00 . 00 4. 50 4.25 8. 75 4.50 4.25 8.75 
Kindergarten girls . 00 . 00 . 00 5.75 5.50 11. 25 5.75 5.50 11. 25 
First grade boys . 25 . 50 . 75 5.50 5.50 10.50 5. 25 4.50 9.75 
First grade girls . 72 . 50 . 12 5.50 5.50 11. 00 4.75 5.00 9.75 
Second grade boys . 00 . 00 . 00 3.75 3.75 7. 50 3.75 3.75 7.50 
Second grade girls . 00 .25 . 25 5.50 5.50 11. 00 5.50 5.25 10.75 
Third grade boys . 74 1. 00 1. 75 6.00 6.00 12.00 5, 25 5.00 10.25 
Third grade girls .25 .25 . 50 5.75 5.75 11. 50 5.50 5.50 11. 00 
aStatistics indicate the average number of correct responses for each group. 
00 
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Table 3, Average scores on pretest and posttest for all grades and sexes by combined teaching methods a 
Pretest Posttest Difference in 2retest-2osttest 
Grade and sex Imagery Concrete Total Imagery Concrete Total Imagery Concrete Total 
Grades and sexes 
combined . 17 . 23 .41 5.17 5.14 10.31 5.00 4. 91 9.89 
Boys of combined 
grades . 19 . 22 . 41 5.03 4.94 9.97 4.84 4 . 72 9. 56 
Girls of combined 
grades . 16 . 25 .41 5.31 5.34 10.66 5.16 5.09 10.22 
Kindergarten . 00 . 00 . 00 4.87 4.81 9.69 4.87 4.81 9.69 
First grade . 37 . 31 . 69 5.37 5.31 10.69 5.00 5.00 9. 94 
Second grade . 00 . 19 .19 4.56 4.56 9.12 4.56 4 . 37 8.94 
Third grade . 31 .44 . 75 5.87 5.87 11. 75 5.56 5.44 11. 00 
Kindergarten boys . 00 . 00 . 00 4.87 4.75 9.62 4.87 4.75 9.62 
Kindergarten girls . 00 . 00 . 00 4.87 4.87 9.75 4.87 4.87 9.75 
First grade boys . 37 . 37 . 75 5.25 5.00 10.25 4.87 4.62 9.50 
First grade girls . 37 .25 . 62 5.50 5.62 11. 12 5.12 5.37 10.37 
Second grade boys . 00 . 00 . 00 4.12 4.12 8.25 4.12 4.12 8.25 
Second grade girls . 00 . 37 . 37 5.00 5.00 10.00 5.00 4.62 9.62 
Third grade boys . 37 . 50 . 87 5.87 5.87 11. 75 5.50 5.37 10. 87 
Third grade girls .25 . 37 . 62 5.87 5.87 11. 75 5.62 5.50 11.12 
a Statistics indicate the average number of correct responses for each group. 
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total pretest scores. Table 2, which presents the same comparison for 
subjects undergoing the imagerial method of instruction, yields similar 
results, the over-all mean increase being 9. 87, or the total posttest scores 
were 1864 per cent of the total pretest scores. Table 3, presenting the 
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increase of the combined methods of instruction, indicates an over-all improve-
ment of 9. 89 on the posttest, or the total posttest scores were 2514 per cent 
of the pretest scores. 
It is therefore concluded that, based on the instruments of measurement 
devised by the writer, young children between the ages of five and eight can learn 
principles of conservation. The question of quality or depth of acquisition will 
be discus se d subsequently . 
Results: Hypothesis 2 
It was hypothesized that subjects would learn more quickly and more 
thoroughly through the use of concrete example than through the use of 
anticipatory imagery. The statistical analysis of the data related to the present 
study requires that this hypothesis be rejected. A comparison of Tables 1 
and 2 shows that subjects in both treatment groups performed approximately 
the same on both pretest and posttest: Subjects under the concrete method of 
ins truction improved their over - all score on the posttest 9. 91 while subjects 
under the imagerial method improved 9. 87. 
Table 4, which presents a summary of the analysis of variance between 
the difference in the total scores on the pretest and posttest and method of 
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instruction, reveals that there was no statistical significance between the 
difference in total scores under either method of treatment. 
Table 4. Summary of the analysis of variance between the difference in _the 
total scores on the pretest and posttest and the method of instruction 
Source of variation 
Method of instruction 
Error 
df 
1 
48 
MS 
. 0156 
9. 1406 
F 
Table 5, summarizing the analysis of variance between extinction 
scores and method of instruction, reveals that teaching method did not make 
a difference in the subjects' performance on the extinction test. 
Table 5. Summary of the analysis of variance between the extinction test 
scores and the method of instruction 
Source of variation df 
Method of instruction 1 
Error 48 
MS 
47.2656 
19. 7656 
F 
1. 55314 
While it is true that the analysis of variance summarized in Table 5 
shows there to be no significant difference between the combined extinction 
scores for both sexes and the method of instruction, Table 31 (Appendix), 
presenting an analysis of varian ce be tween extinction scores and sex by method, 
reveals an important difference between method and sex, the implication of 
which will be considered in the next chapter of this dissertation. 
Results: Hypothesis III 
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It was hypothesized that mental age would be a significant factor in 
determining the gradient of learning through mental imagery. In other words, 
it was assumed that the more advanced the child's mental age, the more adroit 
he would be in using his mental imagery as a medium of acquiring principles 
of conservation. A study of Figure 1 requires that this hypothesis be rejected. 
In presenting in terms of mental age the average score on the posttest for 
subjects having been taught through the use of imagery, Figure 1 reveals no 
predictable pattern. Subjects whose mental age fell in the unit 51-60 months 
averaged 8. 5 on the posttest while subjects with a mental age in 81-90 months 
range averaged only 6. 33. Subjects of mental age 71-80 performed equally 
well as did the subjects with a mental age of 111-120. 
Figure 2, which refines the analysis of mental age into units of five 
months, yielded a similar lack of pattern. It may, therefore, be concluded 
that as measured on the posttest, mental age was not a major factor determin-
ing performance. 
Results: Hypothesis IV 
It was hypothesized that a general trend or point in the maturation 
process would be detected at which the use of mental imagery would be more 
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effectively utilized in acquiring the principles of conservation. The writer 
anticipated an ascending curve on the posttest scores paralleling a rise in 
mental age. An analysis of the available data does not, however, support this 
hypothesis . Figure 1 reveals no pattern of gradiation nor a point in terms of 
mental age at which subjects more effectively use imagery in the learning 
process . As previously mentioned, in Figure 2 the units of mental age were 
refined with the anticipation that such a pattern could be detected. Such was 
not the case. While in Figu r e 2 a possible ascending curve is detectable 
beginning at mental age 68 months, the numbers of subjects involved are 
inadequate for basing even a partial affirmation of the present hypothesis . 
Figur es 3 and 4 are histograms depicting for subjects under imagerial 
instruction the average scores by units of mental age on the test of extinction . 
Here , too, no pattern is obs e rvable. 
In light of the lack of evidence yielded by the available data, one must 
reject the present hypothesis and conclude that among the subjects studied 
there appears no point in terms of mental age at which children begin to use 
more effectively imagery in acquiring the principles of conservation. 
Results: Hypothesis V 
It was hypothesized that extinction would be faster and more complete 
with subjects having been instructed along the lines of anticipatory imagery, 
this method of learning being more abstract than concrete presentations and 
thus the more difficult to acquire. Table 5, presenting a summary of the 
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analysis of variance between the extinction test scores and the method of 
instruction , requires that this hypothesis be rejected. There was no 
statistical difference in the extinction scores between the two methods of 
treatment. 
Table 5. Summary of the analysis of variance between the extinction test 
scores and the method of instruction a 
Source of variation 
Method of instruction 
Error 
df 
1 
48 
MS 
47.2656 
19. 7656 
aTable 5 is repeated for the convenience of the reader 
Summary 
F 
1. 55314 
For the sake of economy, Part IV of this dissertation presented only 
those statistical findings that were directly related to the five proposed hypotheses. 
The reader has been instructed to study the Appendices which contain a more 
detailed presentation of statistical analysis. 
The results pertaining to the five hypotheses were as follows: 
1. Statistical analysis of the available data merited the support of 
the hypothesis that some children of all grade levels and from both methods 
of instruction would grasp the principles of conservation. It was discovered 
that subjects under both treatments and from combined grade levels averaged 
an increase of 3964 per cent on the posttest over the pretest scores. Subjects 
from both treatment groups showed equal improvement. 
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2. It was concluded that subjects undergoing concrete methods of 
instruction did not learn more quickly and more thoroughly than did subjects 
undergoing imagerial instruction. Analysis of variance indicated no difference 
in the two methods of treatment with respect to posttest scores. 
3. The hypothesis that mental age would be a deciding factor in deter-
mining the gradient of learning through mental imagery was rejected. No 
pattern was detected in the improvement scores on the posttest when co-ordinated 
with mental age. 
4 . It was further concluded that based on the data available from the 
present experiment , no specific mental age indicated that beginning of an 
ascending curve showing increased effectiveness in using mental imagery to 
acquire the principles of conservation. It was concluded that factors other 
than mental age influenced the performance of subjects on both the posttest 
and the extinction test. 
5. The hypothesis that extinction would be faster and more complete 
for subjects instructed through mental imagery was rejected. An analysis of 
variance between extinction test scores for combined sexes and method of 
instruction confirmed that treatment made no difference in extinction test 
performance. It was noted , however, that an important difference did exist 
between the method of instruction and the sex of the subject. It was stated 
that the implication of this difference would be discussed in the next chapter. 
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PART V 
DISCUSSION 
Limitations of Study 
The following points seem pertinent as constituting the major limitations 
of this experiment: 
1. The present experiment was limited by the use of subjects from the 
Ellis Elementary School, Logan, Utah. While this school represented as well 
or better than any elementary school in Cache County, Utah, a heterogenous group-
ing of elementary pupils based on socio-economic background, the results of the 
study would have much wider application had subjects from a number of elementary 
schools been utilized. The reasons for limiting the experiment to Ellis Elementary 
School have already been discussed. 
2. Statistically speaking, there were two limitations. One, of the sixty-
four subjects in the experiment, ten scored above zero on the pretest. When 
administered the posttest, these ten subjects collectively averaged 11. 8, show-
ing an improvement score mean of 9. 4. Had these ten subjects made zero on the 
pretest, as did most of the subjects chosen, they would have yielded an average 
improvement score on the posttest of 11. 8. There was no way of statistically 
adjusting for this slight decrease in improvement score. The justification for 
using subjects whose pretest score was above zero will be presented subsequently. 
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Two , while a study of the statistical tables presented in the Appendices 
will reveal that the I. Q. 's, mental ages, and chronological ages of subjects were 
well matched for both treatment groups, there was, as is the case with any ex-
periment of this nature , no way to control variables of personality. Undoubtedly, 
factors of personality did influence subjects' scores. For example, a subject's 
attitude toward authority may have been a variable influencing his responses, 
especially on the extinction test . 
3. While the pretest and posttest were revised during the pilot study 
to provide problems simple enough to accommodate kindergarten subjects and 
difficult enough to challenge third grade subjects ,, all items on the tests called 
for identical responses, in this case the affirmation that substances remained 
equal after transformation. This patterning of identical answers could have 
lead to a perservative effect, with some subjects. In other words, once a sub-
ject "logically perceived" the correct answer to one problem, he may have simply 
persisted in repeating this response to the remainder of the problems without 
genuinely understanding the conservation principles involved. It is felt that the 
pretest and posttest would have more accurately measured true understanding 
of conservation had they contained several problems which called for non-
conservation responses. It would not have been necessary for these latter items 
to have been scored and tabulated, but they might have served as a check for 
possible perseverative responses. Questions one and six of the pretest and post-
test served somewhat in this capacity because they were different in nature from 
the other questions. 
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4. The method of instruction for the anticipatory imagery groups of sub-
jects contained an element which, while unavoidable due to the nature of the 
experiment , may be considered a limitation or weakness. Whlle attempting to 
teach the concepts of conservation through mental imagery , "pure imagery" as 
such was not employed, but rather a blending of mental imagery with auditory 
and visual stimuli which approximat ed or simulated concrete instruction. For 
example, when asking the subject to "visualize" mentally two equal balls of 
clay, hand movements were often used to indicate the size of the balls. When 
describing the length of a string, finger movements were frequently employed 
to indicate the beginning and ending of the imagined string as it lay on the table. 
In this way , hand movements simulated what was materially present for the 
concr ete in structional gToup. Similar "acting out" of procedures was en-
couraged when subjects were asked to use imaginary scissors to cut string, 
paper or similar materials. While it is true that subjects were called upon to 
use their mental imagery , "pur e im agery" was somewhat modified by ex ternal 
stimuli. 
It was felt that subjects of ages five through eight might not be able to 
"imagine" the objects depic ted by ve rbal communication alone, thus leading 
to confusion and invalid instruction . No suggestion can be offered at this time 
for overcoming this inherit weakness . Piaget faced this same dUemma in his 
experiments with mental imagery but went another step away from "pure imagery" 
by showing his subjects the material objects before asking them to ancitipate 
mentally the transformations . Per hap s in the present experiment had a third 
group of subjects been instructed in the principles of conservation by the use of 
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verbal communication only , some indication of the effect of hand movements could 
be determined. 
Observation and Comments on Methods and Procedures 
Selection of subjects 
When considering the subjects for participation in the present experiment, 
it was necessary to decide whether only subjects who had made a score of zero 
on the pretest should be considered for instruction or whether there should be 
a cutoff point near the lower end of the achievement scale on the pretest. It 
was feared that if only subjects having made a score of zero on the pretest 
were chosen , these subjects might make zero on the posttest. thus not indicat-
ing the degree of learning , if any , which had taken place during instruction. 
Subjects registering a slight comprehension of conservation on the pretest 
might better indicate the degree to which instruction had led to further compre-
hension . Therefore , any subject who made a score of three or below on the pre-
test was considered in the population from which a random sample was selected 
for instruction . 
In retrospect , it was se en that the fear expressed above was unfounded. 
Almost all subjects making zero on the pretest showed some improvement on the 
posttest , and those who made a score on one to three of the pretest did not 
necessarily make a perfect score on the posttest. 
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Form of questioning 
There appeared to be basically two ways in which subjects could be 
confronted with questions regarding their comprehension of a conservation 
problem. One , after presenting two equal objects and transforming one, subjects 
could be asked , "Are they still the same or does one now contain more than the 
other?" To pose the question in this manner, as is usually done by Piaget and 
his associates, would be to present the child with all possible alternatives. The 
material may be the same or one may now contain more. The subject, given 
the possible alternatives, simply makes a choice. Two, subjects could be 
asked, "Which one now contains more?" This presentation is somewhat mis-
leading, indicating falsely to the subject that one of the two objects does in fact 
now contain more substance than the other. The latter method of questioning 
was chosen because it required the subject to make an independent rejection of 
the one possibility suggested and to formulate an independent decision. It was 
felt that by using this form of questioning a more accurate measure of the sub-
ject's understanding of conservation would be obtained. 
Group instruction 
Several advantages were found in conducting instructional periods in 
small groups, other than that of conserving time. One , shy children were able 
to find security in the group until they overcame their feeling of uneasiness . 
Two, competition within the group oft en motivated subjects to seek out the 
correct response and explanation for demonstrations of conservation. Three, 
children were able to learn, not only from the instructor, but also from their 
peers. Fourth, in a group setting there was present a degree of play or jubilance 
which might not have been present in individual instruction. 
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The extinction test 
The purpose of the extinction test, as explained elsewhere, was to gain 
an indication of the degree or depth of conservation acquisition obtained by the 
subjects. An extinction test in relation to conservation was first employed by 
Smedslund (1961b), based upon the hypothesis of Clark Hull that resistance 
to extinction was one of the measures of the strength of habit formation. In 
Smedslund's experiment, only three problems of extinction were presented. 
It is felt that this was inadequate, not containing a sufficient number of problems 
to measure accurately the subject's mastery of conservation. Therefore, six 
demonstrations were included in the extinction test. 
It is felt that the extinction test did serve as an indication of the degree 
of acquisition of conservation. The average extinction score for all grades 
and sexes was 11. 5 out of a possible total of 21 points; the standard deviation 
for this mean was 6. 12. The first presentation on the extinction test actually 
did not serve as a measure of extinction, but only as a measure of conservation 
acquisition; therefore, the first demonstration was_ given the weight of only one 
point. In order to have gained the mean of 11. 5, a subject had to resist extinction 
on three and one-half of the remaining five experiments. 
A frequent pattern on the extinction test was one in which the subject 
reverted to non-conservation on one of the demonstrations, but recovered con-
servation on the remainder of the test. Twenty percent of the subjects demonstrated 
this regression to non-conservation and recovered conservation on following problems. 
This one failure or expression of non-conservation did not indicate that the subject 
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did not comprehend conservation, but only that he wavered under the pressure of 
adult authority in favor of non-conservation. The fact that subjects recovered 
conservation on following test questions indicated that they felt uncomfortable 
with their previous decisions not to conserve. 
The writer does not wish to imply that his test of extinction was valid 
with all subjects. Such was not the case. For example, subject KGI, with 
a posttest score of 2, achieved an extinction test score of 15. 0. In most 
cases, however, a low posttest score was paralleled with a low extinction 
test score. In eleven cases, primarily at the second grade level, subjects 
indicated an acquisition of conservation on the posttest, only to call into 
question this acquisition by low scores on the extinction test. All other 
subjects' posttest and extinction test scores reflected parallel levels of 
learning. 
The Present Investigation and Related Studies 
As previously pointed out, the majority of the replicative investi-
gations of Piaget's experiments have dealt with children's comprehension 
and acquisition of the principles of conservation. Estes (1956), Dodwell 
(1961), Love! and Ogilvie (1960), and othershavela1dspecial emphasis 
upon confirming or rejecting Piaget's age limits for conservation ac-
quisition, the influence of I. Q., and/or learning or school experience 
in the mastery of conservation. There have been no recent investigations 
pursuing Piaget's work on anticipatory imagery or the general nature of 
mental imagery per se. 
The present study is not directly a replication of Piaget's work, 
even though there is a close relationship in that Piaget's principles of 
conservation were utilized as a medium of instruction. The present 
study, while stimulated by Piaget's work on mental imagery, only in-
directly parallels this work. Piaget has thus far concerned himself 
with a limited aspect of mental imagery: the use of mental imagery in 
the prediction of transformation related to the principles of conservation. 
The present study is somewhat broader in scope, being concerned with the 
general use of imagery in the learning process, using conservation 
principles only as a convenient medium of learning. 
It appears that Piaget's works on mental imagery contain an un-
fortunate element of semantic confusion. At times Piaget uses the terms 
"anticipatory imagery," "mental imagery, "and "prediction" interchange-
ably. Since these terms are not normally thought of as being synonymous, 
Piaget's use results in a regretable confusion of terminology. 
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Piaget related all three of the above terms to the accurate fore-
casting of transformations of substance. By following this line of investi-
gation, Piaget limits himself to the predictive capacity of mental imagery. 
While defining imagery as " ... the figurative aspect of representational 
thought . . . a kind of interiorized imitation . . . a tool, an aid to the process 
of thought" (Ripple and Rockcastle, 1964, pp. 30-31), Piaget has in practice 
limited his work with imagery to its predictive elements. While the term 
"anticipatory" in the phrase "anticipatory imagery" could well be used 
synonymously with "prediction," the phrase "mental imagery" itself should 
refer to a much broader cognitive function, prediction being but one aspect 
of imagery, The present study has been concerned not with the predictive 
capacity of mental imagery, but with the general phenomenon of mental 
imagery itself as it related to the learning process. 
Piaget has reached several tentative conclusions regarding mental 
imagery. One, there are at least two types of mental imagery: First, 
there is reproductive imagery, " ... representations of situations that have 
been perceived already." (Ripple and Rockcastle, 1964, p. 31) Second, 
Piaget identifies anticipatory imagery, ". . . images which imagine the 
result of a transformation as yet unknown, but which could be predicted on 
the basis of some reasoning." (Ripple and Rockcastle, 1964, p. 31) 
Two , Piaget concludes that the type of imagery utilized by children 
under age seven is generally reproductive in nature. Reproductive imagery 
does not facilitate the acquisition of operations. At an average age of seven 
or later, the age at which children generally acquire conservation, 
reproductive imagery evolves into anticipatory imagery, enabling the child 
to reason through imagination and to solve problems. Anticipatory 
imagery, however, does not lead to operations, but on the contrary, 
operations ( conservation by "logical necessity") lead to anticipatory 
imagery. The complete evolutionary process as conceived by Piaget 
is first "immediate imitation, " followed by "exteriorized" or "inter-
nalized imitation," "reproductive imagery , " and finally "anticipatory 
imagery." (Piaget, 1962; Ripple and Rockcastle, 1964) 
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Three , Piaget holds that the evolution of imagery is intricately 
related to the development of general intelligence (Ripple and Rockcastle, 
1964). Before operational thought, the child does not (cannot) "imagine" 
what he has not previously experienced or mentally perceived as a logical 
necessity . 
In this study mental imagery is defined as that capacity to visualize 
cognitively or internalize reality apart from present external stimuli. 
While there are no grounds other than personal preference for rejecting 
Piaget's dicotomy of imagery into "reproductive" and "anticipatory" 
types , this writer would prefer to look upon imagery as being both re-
productive and predictive at all stages. Regardless of age, once the 
child is able to make any type of predictive evaluation, it is assumed 
that this prediction will be made in conjunction with mental imagery. 
While it may be true that mental imagery for young children is primarily 
reproductiv e in function, it is so only to the extent that children are un-
able to make cognitive prediction at all. Any capacity to predict or 
anticipate must of necessity involve mental imagery at some level of 
its development. While it may well be, as Piaget insists, that the child 
cannot by himself "anticipate" conservation until the appearance of 
operations , it is not necessarily true that the child cannot "anticipate" 
through imagery other, less sophisticated phenomena. There is no 
reason to believe that Piaget would disagree with this thought. 
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Observations Based on Statistical Data 
A study of the statistical data presented in the Appendices will show 
that for the four grade levels considered in the present experiment, I. Q. 's 
were well matched, ranging by grade mean from 104 to 110 and yielding an 
over-all average of 107. The total range of individual I. Q. 's for all grade 
levels was 80 to 143 (Appendices, Table 12), Analysis of variance between 
I. Q. 's and grade level yielded an F of <1, which was not significant at the 
. 05 level (Appendices, Table 19). 
The mental age for the grades involved ranged from a mean of 
71. 56 months at the kindergarten level to 106 . 62 at the third grade level 
(Appendices, Table 13). As would be expected, an analysis of variance 
between mental age and grade level was significant far beyond the . 01 level 
(Appendices, Table 21). There was, however, no significant difference 
between mental age, sex, and method of instruction at any of the respective 
grade levels (Appendices, Table 21). 
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It is important to note that both methods of instruction were well 
balanced at each of the respective grade levels in terms of mental age, I. Q, 's, 
and chronological age. No significant difference was found between these 
variables within each of the grade levels (Appendices, Tables 19, 20, and 21). 
Of particular importance is the fact that an analysis of variance be-
tween the total difference (improvement) scores on the posttest over the pre-
test at each grade level yielded no significant difference (Appendices, Table 
30), From this it is concluded that, generally speaking, children from ages 
five through eight learn the principles of conservation through the use of 
mental imagery as well as they do through the use of concrete example. 
One may assume, therefore I that in other areas imagery would be as 
effective a medium of learning as concrete example. This, however, 
should be empirically investigated. 
One of the most significant outcomes of this study is centered in the 
difference between the pretest scores and the posttest scores, indicating 
that young children between ages five and eight can acquire the principles 
of conservation when taught these concepts in small groups. As previously 
stated, the improvement score for combined treatment methods was 9. 89, 
representing 2412 per cent of the pretest scores. This confirms the find-
ings reported by Beilin and Franklin (1962) and Richards (1968), but con-
tradicts the results confirmed by Smeds lund ( 196 la, 196 lb). An analysis 
of variance between the posttest improvement scores and method of in-
struction shows there to be no significant difference between concrete 
instruction and imagerial instruction (Appendices, Table 30). 
Equally interesting is the observation that when taught principles 
of conservation by methods of concrete example, subjects were able to do 
well on imagerial items of the posttest. The reverse was also true: 
When taught conservation through imagery, subjects performed equally 
well on concrete items. The mean score for combined treatment groups 
on posttest concrete items was 5. 14 with a standard deviation of 1. 40; 
the mean score on posttest imagerial items was 5. 17, standard deviation 
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1. 50. Both imagerial and concrete perception appear to be intricately 
related; transfer of learning between the two is strongly positive. It is 
interesting to note in passing that for combined groups and grades con-
crete items on the pretest had a mean of . 23 with a standard deviation 
of. 55, while imagerial items had a mean of. 17, standard deviation of 
. 55. 
It is noteworthy to point out that kindergarten subjects, in spite of 
their younger age both chronologically and mentally, performed admirably 
well in relation to the older subjects on both the posttest and extinction 
test (Tables 3 and 6). 
Yielding of F of 5. 43, which is statistically significant at the . 01 
level, the analysis of variance between extinction scores and grade level 
indicates a difference between the w:ay the various grade levels performed 
on the extinction test. A study of Table 6 will indicate that the second 
grade, having a mean extinction score of 7. 62 fell considerably below the 
performance level of the other grades. The superior performance of 
grade three subjects (mean 15. 06) is not surprising and can be expected 
on the basis of advanced chronological age and experience. One would 
naturally expect older children to be less influenced by authority and be 
able to maintain their own decisions better than younger children in the 
face of resistance. 
The fact that kindergarten children, having a mean extinction 
score of 12. 87 apparently resisted extinction better than did subjects 
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Table 6. Extin c tion test score averages by grade, method and sex 
Combined Average Average 
Grade average for boys for girls 
Kindergarten 12.87 11. 25 14.50 
First Grade 10.56 8.00 13. 12 
Second Grade 7.62 7. 37 7.75 
Third Grade 15.06 14.00 16.12 
Imperial Groups: 
Kindergarten 11. 62 7.00 16.25 
First Grade 9.50 6.50 12.50 
Second Grade 7.25 5.75 8. 75 
Third Grade 14.25 12. 25 16. 25 
Concrete Groups: 
Kindergarten 14. 12 15.50 12. 75 
First Grade 11. 62 9.50 13. 75 
Second Grade 7.87 9.00 6.75 
Third Grade 15.87 15.75 16.00 
from the first and second grades may be accounted for by two considerations. 
One, kindergarten subjects may not have fully understood the signficance of 
the examiner's showing that what they had previously learned about conservation 
was incorrect. In other words, their minds may have been so concentrated on 
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giving the "correct answer" as previously learned that the demonstration of 
non-conservation may not have been fully comprehended. While this was 
obviously the truth with certain kindergarten subjects, it was not generally 
the case. Kindergarten subjects often expressed as much amazement over 
non-conversation answers as did subjects from other grade levels. The few 
subjects who indicated that they were somewhat oblivious to the apparent 
contradiction between previous learning and the present demonstrations of 
non-conservation, may however have accounted for some of the high mean 
resistance to extinction. 
Two, it might be argued that kindergarten children have not yet con-
formed to-the educational pattern of respecting teacher-authority figures, 
thus not regarding with as much weight the authoritarian position of the 
examiner. 
While not found statistically significant through an analysis of 
variance, note should be made of the dip in scores at the second grade level. 
Table 3 represents the second grade mean posttest score of 9. 12 as com-
pared to 9. 69 for kindergarten subjects, 10. 69 for first grade subjects, and 
11. 75 for third grade subjects. Table 6 presents the second grade mean of 
7. 62 on the extinction test, as compared with a mean of 12. 87, 10. 56, and 
15. 06 for the kindergarten, first, and third grades, respectively. 
Concerning the second grade, at least three possible explanations 
for their low performance on the posttest and extinction test can be offered. 
r 
One, the second grade subjects underwent experimental procedures first, 
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followed by the third grade, the first grade, and then the kindergarten grade. 
One might argue that the examiner, in presenting the instructional material, 
improved with practice, thereby providing later grades with a better opportunity 
to grasp the concepts involved. There was no awareness, however, of any 
modifications in instructional presentation. 
Two, as suggested by Gesell (1955), the child of age seven (the average 
age for second grade subjects in the experiment was 7. 5) undergoes new 
emotional strains in relation to his school situation, strains not experienced 
during his first year of school and overcome by the time he starts the third 
grade. Gesell stated: 
Six characteristically meets obstacles by coming up against 
them head on. Seven meets them by withdrawing as far as 
possible. Six is adventurous, Seven is worried. And so, 
may Sixes sail happily through first grade, and then, to 
everyone's surprise, fail to adjust to second. Second grade 
demands more of them, and also being seven demands more 
of them ... many 7-year-olds tend to be much more de-
pendent on the teacher as a person than they were at six . 
(Gesell, 1955, p. 281) 
Three, and this writer offers this possible solution to the present 
problem as an hypothesis, not as a substantiated conclusion, the period 
of age seven is a critical one in the cognitive transformation of the child 
(Piaget, 1952). Piaget (1952) cited this as the age during which operations 
begin to be formulated; the child is moving from the intuitive thought stage 
to the concrete operations stage. It would appear that at various stages 
of cognitive development the child becomes, as it were, a "new creation, " 
to borrow a Pauline phrase. For example, the child in the preconceptual 
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stage of development is no longer capable of functioning on a purely sensory-
motor level; having achieved the level of concrete operations, the child is 
no longer able to revert exclusively to intuitive thought methods of thinking. 
Cognitively speaking, such metamorphic transformations might even have 
some influence upon the phenomenon known in psychoanalytic circles as 
childhood amnesia--the child may not be able to recall what was experienced 
on a more primitive level of cognitive functioning, a level on which he is 
no longer able to function. 
Further research may confirm that age seven is such a transitional 
period, cognitively speaking , that it generates some degree of confusion 
and hesitancy in the child's thinking. Again, this hypothesis should be 
subjected to controlled experimentation. 
A further study of Table 6 indicates two interesting phenomena. One, 
at every grade level the combined .subjects taught through concrete instruction 
resisted extinction better than did those taught through anticipatory imagery. 
It would appear then that concrete instniction is assimilated more fully than 
is imagerial instruction. This generalization, however, is weak because it 
does not apply to both sexes. With the exception of the first grade level, 
girls in the imageral instructional group did better than girls in the concrete 
instructional group. This difference, however, was slight and not statistically 
significant. One may safely generalize, therefore, that girls from both 
teaching methods did about equally well on the extinction test. 
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The difference in teaching method, as it is indicated through resistance 
to extinction, lay with the boys . Boys from the concrete instructional group 
resisted extinction far better (significant at the . 05 level) than did boys 
from the imagerial group. Therefore, it is concluded that boys grasp and 
retain the principles of conservation better by means of concrete instruction 
than by means of imagerial instruction, . . This does not nullify the previous 
conclusion that children from ages five through eight are able to acquire the 
principles of conservation through both methods of teaching. 
Two, while boys in the concrete instructional group did significantly 
better than boys in the image rial group, girls from the image rial group 
resisted extinction slightly better than did the boys of the concrete instructional 
group. One may safely conclude , therefore, that not only are girls of this age 
able to use more effectively than boys their mental imagery, but that their 
use of mental imagery in acquiring the principles of conservation equals the 
boys' use of concrete example in learning these concepts. 
Conclusions 
The following conclusions may be drawn from the present study: 
1. Children of ages five through eight can acquire the principles of 
conservation when taught these concepts in small groups. This conclusion 
does not imply that children under age five cannot learn to conserve. The 
present study did not investigate the learning abilities of children under age 
five. 
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2. Children of ages five through eight can acquire the basic principles 
of conservation when taught through the medium of concrete example. 
3. Children of ages five through eight can acquire the basic principles 
of conservation when taught through the medium of mental imagery. 
4. Judged on the basis of the instruments employed in the present ex-
periment, mental imagery is well developed in children of kindergarten age. 
This is not to state that mental imagery is as well developed in kindergarten 
children as it is in children of age eight. While the present experiment would 
support such a conclusion, it may be that the instruments of measurement 
utilized were not refined sufficiently to indicate properly a gradiation of 
development. 
5. Girls and boys of ages five through eight utilize concrete example 
equally well in acquiring the principles of conservation. The slight difference 
in the means for the test of extinction for the two sexes may .be attributed to 
sampling error. 
6. Girls of ages five through eight utilize mental imagery better than 
do boys of this age in acquiring a depth understanding of conservation. While 
posttest results indicate that boys and girls taught through imagery learn 
conservation equally well, results from the extinction test confirm the girls' 
superiority. 
7. Girls of ages five through eight utilize mental imagery and concrete 
example in acquiring concepts of conservation equally well. 
8. Boys of ages five through eight utilize concrete example significantly 
better than they do mental imagery in acquiring conservation. 
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9. Girls of ages five through eight utilize mental imagery as well 
as, and perhaps slightly better than, boys of this age utilize concrete example 
in mastering conservation concepts. 
hnplications for Future Research 
Due to the lack of previous research in the use of mental imagery in 
the learning process, it is strongly recommended that the present study be-
duplicated in order to verify its results and conclusions. The present 
experiment utilized the acquisition of conservation as a medium of learning. 
It would be well to extend the learning problems to other areas. Smedslund 
(1961a, 1961b) has suggested that when principles of conservation are 
"taught" by repeated demonstration, this learning tends to be short-lived. 
Since neither Smedslund's experiments nor the present study provide an 
adequate follow-up of retesting after a relatively long period of time, it is 
suggested that future investigations employ a retesting for conservation 
after a period of fifteen to thirty days. 
Since the present study was unable to locate a curve or point in 
terms of mental age at which mental imagery becomes more effective 
in the learning process of young children from ages five through eight, 
it is recommended that additional investigations be conducted in this 
area, using subjects under the age of five. Perhaps a learning curve 
relating to the use of mental imagery does exist for younger children. 
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The most significant finding of the present study was the indication 
that girls utilize their ability for mental imagery better than boys. This 
conclusion should be subjected to verification, and an attempt should be made 
to locate a period in terms of development at which girls begin to use mental 
imagery more effectively than boys. It may also be found that boys catch 
up to girls in this cognitive function as they grow older. 
There has been no attempt in the present study to apply the findings 
regarding the effectiveness of mental imagery in the learning process to an 
educational setting. It would be significant to determine to what degree 
mental imagery is presently employed in the average classroom situation 
and to explore the possibilities of improving education through the increased 
use of mental imagery. 
Summary 
In the present chapter major limitations and restrictions of the study 
were presented. The rationale for the selection of subjects, the form of 
questioning employed, the use of group instruction, and the utilization of a 
test of extinction were discussed. In contrasting the present investigation 
with previous Piagetian studies, it was pointed out . that the present study 
was not a replication of Piaget's work on mental imagery, but rather an 
extension motivated by Piaget's findings. Piaget's contributions to the 
investigation of mental imagery was presented along with an evaluation of 
these contributions. 
A discussion of the statistical analysis of data was given. Special 
attention was directed to the test of extinction and the conclusions that may 
be drawn from the data this test yielded. Finally, conclusions based on the 
present investigation and major implications for future study in the area of 
mental imagery were presented. 
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PART VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
"We cannot think without imagery . " (Aristotle) 
Since the time of Aristotle, and perhaps before, philosophers and 
psychologists , have concerned themselves in varying degrees with the phenomenon 
of thought. Titchener, Binet, Kulpe, Woodworth, Thorndike, Pavlov, Guthrie, 
Hull, Vygotsky, and Piaget, to name but a few, have added to the psychological 
theories attempting to explain this experience which distinguishes the human 
animal as man. And while it would be unjust to minimize the gains achieved 
by those who have contributed so much of themselves in attempting to explain 
man's cognitive nature, it must be admitted that our present state of under-
standing regarding human thought is still fragmentary. Perhaps the greatest 
weakness in previous attempts to comprehend the full nature of the mind has 
been the divisions of cognition into units and the analysis of these units--
concept formation , judgements, memory, imagery, etc. , --as if they were 
wholes. 
A review of the theories of cognition set forth by Jean Piaget con-
firmed that this psychologist is one of the most vigorous and thorough in-
vestigators active in the field of cognitive developments today. A review 
of the literature showed that Piaget's theories and experiments have had 
widespread heuristic effects, motivating other investigators to replicate 
and extend his studies. In general, it has been found that Piaget's theories 
have been supported by additional experimentation. Piaget has established 
a rather definite sequential order for the development of thought processes 
in young children. While some investigators have taken issue with the 
effects that certain variables may have on the acquisition of mental 
operations or conservation,. most writers accept Piaget's general con-
clusions regarding mental growth. 
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The present study has been concerned, not with the acquisition of 
conservation per se, but with the utilization of mental imagery in this process. 
In conducting the present experiment sixty-four subjects were selected 
randomly to participate in one of two instructional methods. Each subject 
was admL.iistered a pretest, the California Test of Mental Maturity, a post--
test, and a test of extinction. On the basis of I. Q. , subjects at each grade 
level--kindergarten, first, second, and third--were placed into one of two 
groups. Groups were well matched according to I. Q. , mental age, 
chronological age, and sex. At each of the four grade levels sixteen sub-
jects, all of whom were non-conservers, were instructed in the principles 
of conservation, eight by the use of concrete example and eight by t~ use 
of mental imagery. Instructional periods were conducted for each group 
by grade level on four consecutive days . 
.. 
By the use of high speed computors the data gathered in the present 
study was analysed, yielding correlations and analysis of variance between 
each of the thirteen variables considered. 
The following five hypotheses were tested: 
1. It was hypothesized that some children from each grade level 
would grasp the principles of conservation when taught through the use of 
concrete example and anticipatory imagery. 
2. It was further hypothesized that subjects would learn to con-
. serve more quickly and thoroughly through the use of concrete example 
than through the use of mental imagery. 
3. It was also hypothesized that the mental age of subjects would 
be a significant factor or variable in determining the gradient of learning 
through mental imagery. In other words, the more advanced the child's 
mental age, the more adroit he would be in using his mental imagery as a 
medium of learning. 
4 . It was hypothesized that between the ages of five and eight a 
general trend or point in the maturation process would be detected at 
which anticipatory imagery can be effectively utilized in the learning 
of conservation. 
5. It was hypothesized that extinction would be faster and more 
complete on the subjects having been instructed through mental imagery 
than on subjects undergoing concrete instruction, mental imagery being 
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a more abstract method of learning and thus requiring more highly developed 
mental structures. 
The analysis of statistical data lead to the acceptance of certain 
of the above hypotheses and rejecting of others. The results are as 
follows: 
1. Hypothesis number one was confirmed: Most children from both 
metlnds of instruction indicated that they had grasped the principles of 
conservation which they had been taught. 
2. Hypothesis number two was rejected: Analysis of variance 
between posttest scores and method of instruction revealed there to be 
no difference between the method of instruction and the acquisition of 
conservation. The anaJysis of variance between extinction test scores 
and sex by method, however, indicated that girls use their mental imagery 
in learning conservation better than do boys. It is further shown that boys 
learn conservation better through concrete example than they do through 
mental imagery. When both sexes were considered as a unit, however, 
there was no difference in the level of conservation acquisition. 
3. Hypothesis number three was rejected. An analysis of the 
scores made on the posttest and the extinction test, when viewed in terms 
of mental age, revealed no pattern or gradiational curve. Mental age 
was not considered to be a factor or variable in the acquisition of the 
principles of conservation. 
4. Hypothesis number four was rejected. As would be expected 
from the rejection by hypothesis number three, scores on the posttest 
and extinction test did not reveal an upward movement paralleled with 
mental age in the mastery of conservation. No curve or pattern was dis-
cernable. 
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5. Hypothesis number five was rejected: An analysis of variance 
between the extinction scores and method of instruction indicated no signficant 
difference between the combined scores of both sexes and their respective 
method of instruction. As was pointed out before, when considered by sex, 
boys acquiring conservation through concrete example resisted extinction 
better than did boys receiving instruction through mental imagery. Al so, 
girls receiving instruction through mental imagery resisted extinction 
better than the boys in the imagerial group and as well as the boys in the 
concrete example group. 
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Based upon a study of the results of statistical analysis, the following 
conclusions were drawn: 
1. Children of ages five through eight can acquire the principles 
of conservation when taught these concepts in small groups. 
2. Children of ages five through eight can acquire the basic principles 
of conservation when taught through the medium of concrete example. 
3. Children of ages five through eight can acquire the basic principles 
of conservation when taught through the medium of mental imagel,'y. 
4. Mental imagery is well developed in children in kindergarten age, 
though not necessarily as highly developed as in children of greater age. 
5. Girls and boys of ages five through eight utilize concrete example 
equally well in acquiring the principles of conservation. 
6. Girls of ages five through eight utilize mental imagery better 
than do boys of this same age in acquiring a depth understanding of con-
servation. 
7. Girls of ages five through eight utilize mental imagery and 
concrete example in acquiring concepts of conservation equally well. 
8. Boys of ages five through eight utilize concrete example 
significantly better than they do mental imagery in acquiring conservation. 
9. Girls of ages five through eight utilize mental imagery as well 
as, and perhaps slightly better than, b()ys of this age utilize concrete 
example in mastering conservation concepts. 
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Table 7. Basic information regarding the subjects in the anticipatory imagery 
groups 
Pretest Posttest 
Subject's Mental Chronological total total Extinction 
a Ageb Ageb code name I. Q. score score score 
Kindergarten subjects 
KBl 122 86 72 00 00 00 
KB3 114 70 62 00 12 06 
KB5 113 75 67 00 12 06 
KB9 101 62 61 00 11 16 
KG9 111 78 71 00 12 08 
KG6 105 65 62 00 12 21 
KG8 99 70 70 00 10 21 
KGlO 80 53 65 00 11 15 
First grade subjects 
lBl 132 97 75 00 12 21 
1B5 108 90 84 03 12 04 
1B7 103 80 78 00 12 06 
1B9 69 55 77 00 06 04 
1G2 128 102 81 00 10 16 
1G4 117 94 81 00 12 12 
1G6 109 86 79 03 10 12 
1G8 95 71 74 02 12 10 
aThe first unit or digit in the code name refers to the grade level; the second 
unit, B or G, refers to boy or girl; the number following the letter ranks the 
bsubject according to I. Q. among those tested at a particular grade level. 
Age is express ed in months. 
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Table 7. Continued 
Pretest Posttest 
Mentgl Chronological total total Extinction a 
ageb code name I. Q. age . score score score 
Second grade 
2B3 106 93 87 00 10 06 
2B5 103 95 91 00 12 10 
2B7 102 86 84 00 03 03 
2B8 92 87 93 00 05 01 
2G2 119 110 92 00 10 06 
2G3 112 94 84 01 12 06 
2G4 101 96 93 00 12 06 
2G6 99 88 88 00 10 17 
Third grade 
3Bl 122 118 96 00 12 03 
3B4 112 114 114 01 12 14 
3B6 97 108 108 05 12 15 
3B8 89 93 102 01 12 17 
3G2 109 113 102 00 12 12 
3G4 105 108 101 02 12 15 
3G6 101 101 98 00 10 17 
3GB 90 103 112 00 12 21 
aThe first unit or digit in the code name refers to the grade level; the second 
unit, B or G, refers to boy or girl; the number following the letter ranks the 
bsubject according to I. Q. among those tested at a particular grade level. 
Age is expressed in months. 
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Table 8. Basic information regarding the subjects in the concrete groups 
Pretest Posttest 
Subject's M~n 5a1 Chronological total total Extinction a 
ageb code name I. Q. age score score score 
Kindergarten subjects 
KB2 119 81 69 00 10 12 
KB4 113 78 70 00 10 21 
KB6 112 69 62 00 12 17 
KB8 107 66 62 00 10 12 
KGl 120 79 66 00 12 10 
KG3 112 74 68 00 10 06 
KG7 102 75 74 00 09 20 
KG9 88 64 72 00 02 15 
First grade subjects 
1B2 124 93 76 03 12 06 
1B4 118 87 75 00 06 09 
1B6 105 85 81 00 12 04 
1B8 199 79 80 00 10 19 
lGl 143 104 75 00 10 17 
1G3 121 93 78 00 12 12 
1G7 102 75 74 00 12 16 
1G9 89 70 78 00 11 10 
aThe first unit or digit in the code name refers to the grade level; the second 
unit, B or G, refers to boy or girl; the number following the letter ranks the 
bsubject according to I. Q. among those tested at a particular grade level. 
Age is expressed in months. 
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Table 8. Continued . 
Pretest Posttest 
Mental Chronological total total Extinction 
code namea I. Q . ageb ageb score score score 
Second grade 
2Bl 113 101 90 00 12 08 
2B2 111 98 88 00 12 21 
2B4 103 99 95 00 12 06 
2B6 102 94 91 00 00 01 
2Gl 122 111 91 02 12 10 
2G5 101 87 85 00 08 06 
2G7 98 92 92 00 11 10 
2G8 93 91 96 00 05 01 
Third grade 
3B2 119 115 96 00 12 21 
3B3 113 112 98 00 12 21 
3B5 102 102 97 00 12 09 
3B8 93 94 99 00 10 12 
3Gl 111 118 104 00 12 06 
3G3 106 103 96 00 12 21 
3G5 105 107 100 03 12 16 
3<;}7 93 97 102 00 12 21 
aThe first unit or digit in the code name refers to the grade level; the second 
unit, B or G, refers to boy or girl; the number following the letter ranks the 
bsubject according to I. Q. among those tested at a particular grade level. 
Age is expressed in months. 
Table 9. Extinction scores for subjects under anticipatory imagery 
teaching methoda 
Grade and sex Extinction score 
All grades combined 10.66 
Kindergarten 11. 62 
First grade 9.50 
Second grade 7.25 
Third grade 14.25 
Both sexes combined 10.66 
Boys 7.87 
Girls 13.44 
Kindergarten boys 7.00 
Kindergarten girls 16.25 
First grade boys 6.50 
First grade girls 12.50 
Second grade boys 5.75 
Second grade girls 8.75 
Third grade boys 12.25 
Third grade girls 16.25 
a Statistics indicate the average number of points earned for each group. 
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Table 10. Extinction scores for subjects under concrete teaching methoda 
Grade and sex Extinction score 
All grade combined 12.37 
Kindergarten 14. 12 
First grade 11. 62 
Second grade 7.87 
Third grade 15.87 
Both sexes combines 12.37 
Boys 12.44 
Girls 12.31 
Kindergarten boys 15.50 
Kindergarten girls 12.75 
First grade boys 9.50 
First grade girls 13.75 
Second grade boys 9.00 
Second grade girls 6.75 
Third grade boys 15.75 
Third grade girls 16.00 
a Statistics indicate the average number of points earned for each group. 
Table 11. Extinction scores for combined teaching methods by grade and 
sexa 
Grade and sex Extinction score 
Grades and sexes combined 11. 51 
Boys of combined grades 10. 16 
Girls of combined grades 12.87 
Kindergarten 12.87 
First grade 10.56 
Second grade 7.56 
Third grade 15.06 
Kindergarten boys 11. 25 
Kindergarten girls 14 . 50 
First grade boys 8.00 
First grade girls 13. 12 
Second grade boys 7.37 
Second grade girls 7.75 
Third grade boys 14 . 00 
Third grade girls 16. 12 
a Statistics indicate the average number of points earned on the extinction 
test by each group. 
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Table 12. Average I. Q . by grade and sex 
Grade Boys Girls 
Kindergarten 112.62 102.12 
First grade 107.25 113. 00 
Second grade 104.00 105,62 
Third grade 105.87 102,50 
All grades combined 107.43 105.81 
a Table 13. Average mental age by gTade and sex 
Grade Boys Girls 
Kindergarten 73.37 69.75 
First grade 83.25 86.87 
Second grade 94.12 96.12 
Third grade 107.00 106.25 
All grades combined 89.43 89. 75 
aMental age is expressed in months. 
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Combined 
sex Range 
107.37 80-122 
110.12 69-143 
104.81 92-122 
104.18 89-122 
106.62 80-143 
Combined 
sex Range 
71. 56 53.-86. 
85.06 55. -104. 
95. 12 86.-111. 
106.62 93. -118. 
89.59 53. -118. 
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Table 14. Average I. Q. by teaching method: grade and sex 
Combined 
Teaching method and grade Boys Girls sex Range 
Anticipatory imagery method 105.31 105.00 105.15 69-132 
Concrete method 109.56 106.62 108.09 88-143 
Anticipatory imagery method: 
Kindergarten 112. 50 98.75 105.62 80-122 
First grade 103.00 112.25 107.62 69-132 
Second grade 100.75 107.75 104.25 92-119 
Third grade 105.00 101. 25 103.12 89-122 
Concrete method: 
Kindergarten 112.75 105.50 109. 12 88-120 
First grade 111.50 113. 75 112.62 89-143 
Second grade 107.25 103.50 105.37 93-122 
Third grade 106.75 103.75 105.25 93-119 
Table 15. Average mental age by teaching method: grade and sex a 
Combined 
Teaching method and grade Boys Girls sex Range 
Anticipatory imagery method 88.06 89.50 88.78 53. -118. 
Concrete method 90.81 90.00 90.40 64. -115. 
Anticipatory imagery method : 
Kindergarten 73.25 66.50 69.87 53.-86. 
First grade 80.50 88. 25 84. 37 55. -102. 
Second grade 90.25 97.00 93.62 86. -110. 
Third grade 108.25 106.25 107.25 93. -118. 
Concrete method: 
Kindergarten 73.50 73.00 73.25 64. -81. 
First grade 86.00 85.50 85.75 70.-104. 
Second grade 98.00 95. 25 96.62 87. -111. 
Third grade 105.75 106.25 106.00 94. -115. 
a Mental age is expressed in months. 
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Table 16. Average chronological age by grade and sex a 
Combined 
Grade Boys Girls sex Range 
Kindergarten 65.62 68.50 67.06 61-74 
First grade 78. 25 77.50 77.87 74-84 
Second grade 89.87 90.12 90.00 84-96 
Third grade 99.50 101. 87 100.68 96-112 
All grades combined 83.31 84. 50 83. 90 61-112 
aChronological age is expressed in months. 
Table 1 7. Average chronological age by teaching method: grade and sex a 
Combined 
Teaching method and grade Boys Girls sex Range 
Anticipatory imagery method 83.56 84. 56 84.06 61-112 
Concrete method 83.06 84. 43 83.75 62-104 
Anticipatory imagery method: 
Kindergarten 65 . 50 67.80 66.25 61-72 
First grade 78.50 78.75 78.62 74-84 
Second grade 88.75 89. 25 89.00 84-93 
Third grade 101. 50 103.25 102.37 96-112 
Concrete method: 
Kindergarten 65.75 70.00 67.87 62-74 
First grade 78.00 76. 25 . 77. 12 74-81 
Second grade 91. 00 91. 00 91. 00 85-96 
Third grade 97.50 100.50 99.00 96-104 
aChronological age is expressed in months. 
Table 18. Correlational matrix for the variables considered in the present study 
00 I [/). [/). 
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I. Q . .41 -.18 . 02 -.006 . 0096 . 22 . 157 . 19 .21 . 157 . 197 -.038 
Mental age . 81 .26 . 13 .21 . 26 . 20 .238 . 169 . 15 . 17 . 015 
Chronological age . 26 . 15 . 22 . 13 . 10 . 12 . 035 . 049 . 046 . 041 
Pretest: Concrete items . 69 . 92 . 23 . 21 . 22 -. 15 -.03 -.09 . 12 
Pretest: Imagery items .91 .14 . 13 . 14 -.12 -.22 -.17 -.003 
Pretest: Total score . 20 . 18 . 20 -.14 -. 14 -.14 -.008 
Posttest: Concrete items . 94 .98 .92 . 87 . 91 . 36 
Posttest: Imagery items . 986 . 87 .93 . 93 . 35 
Posttest: Total score .91 .91 . 93 . 36 
Difference on pre-post 
concrete .90 .97 . 38 
Difference on pre-post 
imagery . 97 . 35 
Difference on pre-post 
totals . 37 
Extinction test scores 
"""' c.:, 
00 
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Table 19. Summary of the analysis of variance between I. Q. and other major 
variables in the study 
Source of variation df MS F 
Sex 1 42.250 <1 
Method 1 138.0625 (1 
Grade 3 117. 5417 <1 
Sex by method 1 27.5625 <1 
Sex by grade 3 195.7083 1.11 
Method by grade 3 11. 3541 <1 
Sex by method by grade 3 59, 9375 <: 1 
Error 48 176. 2396 
Table 20 . Summary of the analysis of variance between chronological age 
and other major variables in the study 
Source of variation df MS 
Sex 1 22.5625 
Method 1 1. 5625 
Grade 3 3407.104 
Sex by method 1 . 5625 
Sex by grade 3 11. 8541 
Method by grade 3 26. 5208 
Sex by method by grade 3 15. 7812 
Error 48 176.6895 
*Significant at the . 05 level where . 05 = F of 4. 04 or more. 
**Si gnificant at the . 01 level where . 01 = F of 4. 22 or more. 
F 
1. 4297 
<._1 
215.8956** 
(1 
<1 
1. 68 
<1 
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Table 21. Summary of the analysis of variance between mental age and other 
major variables in the study 
Source of variation df MS 
Sex 1 1. 5625 
Method 1 42.2500 
Grade 3 3553.687 
Sex by method 1 20.2500 
Sex by grade 3 40.60416 
Method by grade 3 17.70533 
Sex by method by grade 3 61. 1250 
Error 48 102. 9583 
*Significant at the . 05 level where . 05 = F of 4. 04 or more. 
**Significant at the . 01 level where . 01 = F of 4. 22 or more. 
F 
(1 
<1 
34.5157** 
<1 
<1 
<1 
<1 
Table 22. Summary of the analysis of variance between imagerial items on 
the pretest and other major variables in the study 
Source of variation df MS F 
Sex 1 . 015625 (1 
Method 1 . 390625 1.27 
Grade 3 .640625 2.085 
Sex by method 1 . 015625 < 1 
Sex by grade 3 . 015625 <. 1 
Method by grade 3 . 140625 (1 
Sex by method by grade 3 . 515623 1. 678 
Error 48 . 307291 
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Table 23. Summary of the analysis of variance between concrete items on the 
pretest and other major variables in the study 
Source of variation df MS F 
Sex 1 . 015625 < 1 
Method 1 . 390625 1. 3157 
Grade 3 . 557291 1. 877 
Sex by method 1 . 390625 1. 3157 
Sex by grade 3 . 223958 <1 
Method by grade 3 . 265625 < 1 
Sex by method by grade 3 . 432291 1.456 
Error 48 . 296875 
Table 24. Summary of the analysis of variance between scores on the concrete 
items of the posttest and other major variables in the study 
Source of variation df MS F 
Sex 1 2. 6406 1.2396 
Method 1 . 015625 < 1 
Grade 3 5.390625 2.5306 
Sex by method 1 2 . 640625 1. 2396 
Sex by grade 3 . 682291 <1 
Method by grade 3 . 057291 (1 
Sex by method by grade 3 1. 93229 (1 
Error 48 2.130208 
Table 25. Summary of the analysis of variance between scores on the 
imagerial items of the posttest and other major variables in 
the study 
Source of variation df MS F 
Sex 1 1. 265625 1 
Method 1 . 765625 1 
Grade 3 5.307291 2.182 
Sex by method 1 2.640625 . 1. 0856 
Sex by grade 3 . 682291 1 
Method by grade 3 . 182291 1 
Sex by method by grade 3 2.390625 1 
Error 48 2.432291 
Table 26. Summary of the analysis of variance between total scores on the 
r>rete ·st and other major variables in the study 
Source of variation df MS F 
Sex 1 0 . 0 <1 
Method l 1. 5625 1.5464 
Grade 3 2.1875 2.1649 
Sex by method 1 .250 < 1 
Sex by grade 3 . 2916 <1 
Method by grade 3 .7708 <1 
Sex by method by grade 3 1. 7916 1. 771 
Error 48 1. 0104 
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Table 2 7. Summary of the analysis of variance between total posttest scores 
and other major variables in the study 
Source of variation df MS F 
Sex 1 7.5625 <1 
Method 1 1.0 <1 
Grade 3 21. 3750 2.4198 
Sex by method 1 10.5625 1. 19575 
Sex by grade 3 2.6041 <1 
Method by grade 3 .2916 ( 1 
Sex by method by frade 3 8.6041 < 1 
Error 48 8. 8333 
Table 28. Summary of the analysis of variance between the difference in 
scores on imagerial items on the pretest and other major variables 
in the study 
Source of variation df MS F 
Sex 1 1. 5625 < 1 
Method 1 . 0625 <1 
Grade 3 2.7916 1. 055 
Sex by method 1 2.25 <1 
Sex by grade 3 .60416 < 1 
Method by grade 3 . 52083 <1 
Sex by method by grade 3 3.12500 1. 1811 
Error 48 2.64583 
Table 29. Summary of the analysis of variance between the difference in 
scores on concrete items on pretest and other major variables 
in the study 
Source of variation df MS F 
Sex 1 2.25 (_ 1 
Method 1 .25 .! 1 
144 
Grade 3 3. 104166 1. 4466 
Sex by method 1 5.0625 2.35922 
Sex by grade 3 . 375 < 1 
Method by grade 3 . 54166 (1 
Sex by method by grade 3 1. 60416 (1 
Error 48 2 . 145833 
Table 30. Summary of the analysis of variance between the difference in the 
total scores on the pretest and posttest and other major variables 
in the study 
Source of variation df MS F 
Sex 1 6.8906 < 1 
Method 1 . 0156 <1 
Grade 3 11. 6406 1. 2735 
Sex by method 1 15.0156 1. 6427 
Sex by grade 3 1. 3489 (1 
Method by grade 3 1. 6406 <1 
Sex by method by grade 3 8.5572 <1 
Error 48 9. 1406 
145 
Table 31. Summary of the analysis of variance between the extinction test 
scores and other major variables in the study 
Source of variation df MS 
Sex 1 118. 2656 
Method 1 47.2656 
Grade 3 165.1406 
Sex by method 1 129.3906 
Sex by grade 3 15.8906 
Sex by method by grade 3 2.6406 
Error 48 19. 7656 
*Significant at the . 05 level where . 05 = F of 4. 04 or more. 
**Significant at the . 01 level where . 01 = F of 4. 22 or more. 
F 
3.8861 
1. 55314 
5.42649** 
4.25175* 
1 
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